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Abstract 
We pursue an economic approach to analysing poverty. This requires a focus on 
the variables that individuals can influence, such as forming or dissolving a 
union or having children. We argue that this indirect approach to modelling 
poverty is the right way to bring economic tools to bear on the issue. In our 
implementation of this approach, we focus on endogenous demographic and 
employment transitions as the driving forces behind changes in poverty. We 
construct a dataset covering event histories over a long window and estimate 
five simultaneous hazards with unrestricted correlated heterogeneity. The model 
fits the demographic and poverty data reasonably well. We investigate the 
important parameters and processes for differences in individuals’ poverty 
likelihood. Employment, and particularly employment of disadvantaged women 
with children, is important.  
 
Keywords: poverty dynamics; poverty transitions; simultaneous hazards. 
JEL Codes: I32 
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Non-technical summary 
In this paper we bridge two different traditions in analysing poverty. Much of 
the economics research on poverty has concerned measurement, clearly a key 
task, but only a starting point. The analysis has typically been atheoretical, 
focussing on statistical issues or decompositions of poverty trends. Examples of 
the former include Cappellari and Jenkins (2004), which provides a detailed 
analysis of the dynamics of individual poverty experience. An example of the 
latter includes Hoynes et al (2005), which provides a thorough decomposition of 
poverty trends in the US. These studies are very useful, but do not connect with 
the core of economic analysis – the analysis of economic decisions. We argue 
below that they cannot connect with this because individuals do not make 
decisions directly about their poverty status. They may not even know whether 
they are (officially) poor or not since this depends on a comparison of their 
income with (60% of) the national median.  
 
The tradition in social policy is to focus on a set of events that happen to people 
and propel them into poverty. This includes unemployment, divorce, the arrival 
of children, sickness, and old age. The analysis proceeds by quantifying the 
impact of these events on subsequent income and poverty status. The classic 
exposition of this view was developed by Rowntree (1901). Beveridge drew 
heavily on it in his report (Glennerster and Evans 1994). More recently 
Piachaud and Webb (2004) compare the causes of poverty analysed in this way 
for 1899 and 2001/2 and compare the size of the poverty gap resulting from 
such events (pp48-50). This focus on the underlying events is useful since these 
are the true drivers of poverty dynamics. However, treating marriage and 
divorce, fertility and employment transitions as exogenous events runs against a 
lot of accumulated evidence showing that these are decision variables that 
individuals exert some (but not complete) control over. For example, an 
individual’s wage rate has been shown to influence her propensity to have 
children at a particular age, to marry and to divorce. Ignoring this will lead to 
biased conclusions. For example, if some individuals are disproportionately 
likely to divorce, if their characteristics also make them susceptible to poverty, 
this would be inappropriately assigned to the effects of divorce. 
 
In this paper, we bring these perspectives together. Relative to a social policy 
approach, we treat these life events as inter-related, endogenous processes. This 
makes the basis for our statistical inference more secure. Relative to the existing 
economic literature, by tying an analysis of poverty to individual decisions, we 
facilitate the use of economic analysis in empirical models of poverty. 
 
 v
We study working age individuals (so ignoring poverty in old age), and focus 
on marriage (union) and separation, having children and transitions into and out 
of employment. We create a dataset of long life histories of these events from 
the British Household Panel Survey retrospective files. We utilise these plus 
other socio-economic data to produce economic models of these demographic 
and employment transitions. The model fits the demographic data well. We 
move from this analysis of the underlying endogenous events to a model of 
poverty by adding a straightforward income model. We show that this fits the 
data on poverty well. 
 
The fruits of this approach are two-fold. First, it opens the door to the economic 
analysis of poverty. Second, we can use it to isolate what are the important 
factors for poverty. We simulate the effect of marginal changes in the chance of 
making the different transitions, and compare the outcomes. It is important to be 
clear that this takes account of all the undoubted interaction between the 
processes; so, for example, changing the propensity to become married 
influences marital status but also, through that, employment status and fertility. 
All these combine to change poverty. These parameter experiments show that 
the employment transitions are the most important. We also show that for 
disadvantaged women, the chance of being employed whilst having a young 
child is a key factor. This all gives support to a “work first” policy.  
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1. Introduction 
Poverty remains a major issue, even in the developed world. The Lisbon 
Summit of the European Union in 2000 noted that the Union contained 60 
million people poor or at high risk of poverty. In the UK, the Labour 
government ambitiously pledged to halve and then eliminate child poverty. In 
the US, there remain over 35m people in poverty, despite the most prolonged 
economic upturn for many years. Despite this, there are few empirical analyses 
of poverty in economics, certainly compared to the substantial literatures on 
measuring poverty, or on analysing earnings inequality. For reasons we set out 
shortly, poverty is a more complex phenomenon than earnings inequality and 
consequently harder to model in a useful way. In this paper, we pursue a 
different way of analysing poverty, which comes at the problem indirectly.1 We 
implement this using a long panel of UK data, and assess the important 
processes that influence individuals’ likelihood of poverty.  
 
Poverty is essentially a binary state, and almost all studies measure and analyse 
it as such.2 In this paper, we argue that it makes little sense to analyse poverty as 
a standard dichotomous variable or a Markov renewal process. Unlike a binary 
decision to go to college (for example), or decisions about repeatedly moving in 
and out of unemployment, poverty is not a decision variable. Two points make 
this very clear. First, an individual will in general not even know whether s/he is 
officially poor or not. Second, an individual can transit in or out of being 
officially poor even if nothing in his/her own circumstances changes. So an 
economic analysis, based on individuals and households making decisions, 
using this approach is unlikely to be fruitful.  
 
One short-cut out of this problem is to use the well-developed models of 
earnings, and to argue that this constitutes the core of poverty. In fact, it is now 
well known that demographic changes are as important as changes in earnings,3 
so this becomes a very partial approach. Unlike earnings, poverty is a 
characteristic of households rather than individuals.4 If households were fixed in 
                                           
1  This is a continuation and extension of our earlier work on poverty in the US using 
the NLSY (see Burgess and Propper, 1998).  
2  Some authors blur the distinction at the margin by using a ‘fuzzy’ poverty line, for 
example, Cerioli and Zani (1990), Betti and Verma (1999), Maggio (2004).  
3  Bane and Ellwood (1986), Stevens (1994, 1999), Jarvis and Jenkins (1996), Jenkins 
(2000). 
4  There are an increasing number of studies that examine the intra-household allocation 
of resources.  
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composition, then the only extra factors between earnings and household 
income would be labour supply, and the matching of individuals into 
households. But of course this is not the case – households form, dissolve and 
reform, potentially many times. These processes are endogenous to income, to 
labour supply and to each other.  
 
We propose to empirically model the behavioural decisions underlying poverty: 
whether to work, to have children, to form or to end a union. This analysis is 
econometrically complex as these decisions are very likely to be linked. 
Accordingly, we estimate a model with five simultaneous hazards (for fertility, 
union transitions and employment transitions), allowing for extensive cross-
process interactions and correlated heterogeneity.5 We construct a long panel of 
event histories for fertility, union, dissolution and spells in and out of work for 
Britain for the analysis. The estimation is successful and fits the data on 
demographic spells and transitions well.  
 
From this analysis plus a simple model of income, we construct an analysis of 
poverty itself. The strategy of the paper is to focus on explaining demographic 
and employment transitions as the key to explaining poverty dynamics, and we 
use our estimates of state transitions to model time spent in particular 
demographic/employment states. The simple process we assume for income 
generation within these states means that we can use the mean poverty rates in 
those narrowly defined states6 to translate this analysis into an analysis of 
individual poverty. In our data, between-state differences in poverty explain 
over half of the variation in individual poverty status, as opposed to within-state 
variation. Thus while we clearly cannot hope to explain all differences in 
poverty using this approach, we are addressing the key source of variation.  
 
The results are encouraging, and the model fits the demographic patterns well.7 
The approach does a good job of capturing the key facts of dynamic poverty 
experiences. We use the model to examine what the important processes are for 
poverty, simulating the dynamic properties of the model. We show that 
generally the employment process is most important. This works both through a 
direct impact on poverty, but also on marriage and fertility hazards. For 
disadvantaged women, what matters most is the link between employment and 
children; that is, changing the ease of getting a job for someone with young 
children brings the biggest reduction in sustained poverty of all our 
                                           
5  This builds on Aassve et al (2004) which describes the estimation of the demographic 
transitions in detail, but is not a model of poverty. 
6  For example, such a state might be “not employed, married, with two children”. 
7  We discuss the demographics per se in detail elsewhere (Aassve et al, 2004). 
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experiments. Our analysis is empirical comparative dynamics, not detailed 
policy analysis, but these results give some support to the idea that work 
promotion and child care may be important focuses for anti-poverty policy.  
 
We structure the paper as follows. Section 2 reviews different methodologies 
for analysing poverty and Section 3 presents our approach. Section 4 then 
describes our dataset, and Section 5 the econometric model. The results of the 
estimation follow. Sections 7 and 8 present our main results – first evaluating 
how well the model fits poverty, and second exploring what the model says 
about the key dynamic processes for poverty. Section 9 concludes.  
 
2. Modelling Poverty Dynamics – A Review of the Literature 
We review different empirical methodologies for analyzing poverty.8 We can 
broadly characterise approaches to modelling poverty into five differing 
methodologies, though there are obviously areas of overlap. These are: (a) 
components of variance models; (b) hazard rate models; (c) Markov transition 
models; (d) dynamic discrete choice models; and (e) decomposition methods. 
Each has its merits, but none fully capture the jointly determined inter-related 
labour market and demographic processes which result in the poverty outcome.  
 
a.  Components of variance models 
These models allow for a complex error structure to capture the dynamics of 
income and predict the fraction of the population that are likely to be in poverty 
and for how long. Originally used by Lillard and Willis (1978) this method has 
been employed more recently by Stevens (1999) and in the UK by Devicienti 
(2001). As Bane and Ellwood (1986) highlight and as echoed by Jenkins (2000), 
these models have appeal in their ability to decompose income changes into 
permanent and transitory components and therefore provide a more accurate 
assessment of an individual’s long term position. Moreover examining income 
rather than just a binary poverty indicator means that no information is 
discarded, and it can be seen whether individuals move just out of poverty or 
move clear above the poverty line.  
 
However, these models also have notable disadvantages in this context. The 
main short coming is that they can only really explain the poverty dynamics of 
one homogenous set of individuals at a time, being unable to accommodate the 
fact that poverty is a feature of households and that household composition 
                                           
8  We do not review the results on poverty dynamics - see Jenkins and Rigg (2001) for 
the UK. Nor do we attempt to review the vast separate literatures on fertility, marriage 
transitions, or employment transition - see Aassve et al (2004) for a partial review. 
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changes over time. These models do not address demographic or labour market 
events. A further problem is the common assumption of the same dynamic 
process applying to the richer and the poorer individuals, which is unlikely to be 
the case.  
 
Stevens (1999) and Devicienti (2001) both conclude that in comparison to the 
duration modelling that they implement, the components of variance models of 
poverty perform less well in fitting the observed patterns of poverty in the US 
and UK respectively. Jenkins (2000) concludes that these models are best 
applied to the context that they were originally taken from and that is the 
analysis of the income dynamics of a single homogenous group – for example 
prime-age males. This circumvents the need to consider all of the household’s 
income sources and the effects of changing household composition.  
 
b.  Hazard rate models 
A long-standing approach is to model poverty transitions using a hazard rate 
framework. This approach was taken by Bane and Ellwood (1986) and has since 
been modified and used by inter alia Stevens (1994, 1999) in the US and 
Devicienti (2001)in the UK. Bane and Ellwood examined poverty by looking at 
exit probabilities for individuals in the PSID between 1970 and 1982. Spells of 
poverty are identified and hazard functions for exiting poverty are estimated and 
used to generate distributions of spell lengths for new spells and also for 
completed and uncompleted spells at a given point in time.  
 
Bane and Ellwood also look at events associated with poverty transitions 
according to a hierarchical structure of possible ‘trigger events’ – first of all any 
changes in head of household in the preceding two years are looked for. If such 
a change has occurred then the transition is associated with this ‘trigger event’; 
if no such change has occurred the next thing that is examined is the change in 
the income/needs ratio and whether this has been more caused by changes in the 
numerator (income events) or changes in the denominator (demographic 
events). In such a way Bane and Ellwood classify the triggers for a poverty 
spell’s beginning or end, as well as looking at the expected duration of spell 
lengths according to the event that triggered the spell both for those just 
commencing a poverty spell and those already in poverty because of the 
associated trigger event.  
 
However, research since then has highlighted the limitations of the analysis of 
single spells only, chiefly the fact that a single spell analysis does not take into 
account that those who climb out of poverty are likely to fall back into poverty. 
Stevens (1999) in particular augments the Bane and Ellwood methodology to 
allow for multiple spells of poverty. Stevens analyses poverty persistence in the 
same PSID dataset by simultaneously estimating two separate hazard rates for 
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those who are ever poor: the hazard for exiting poverty depends on a function of 
individual and household characteristics, the duration of the current spell of 
poverty and an individual heterogeneity term; similarly the hazard for re-
entering poverty depends on a function of individual and household 
characteristics, the duration of the current non-poverty spell and a separate 
individual heterogeneity term. Stevens addresses the initial conditions problem 
and, given multiple spells, time-invariant individual fixed effects terms are 
included within each process to account for correlation across an individuals 
exit and re-entry probabilities over time. Stevens demonstrates that the multi 
spell model of poverty fits the observed pattern of poverty persistence much 
better than the single spell model. Implementing a model very similar to the 
Stevens model, Jenkins and Rigg (2001) and Devicienti (2001) demonstrate that 
the necessity of modelling multiple spells of poverty applies equally to the UK. 
 
There are, however, a number of problems with the hazard rate approach in this 
context. While these models take a broadly dynamic approach, there is still a 
considerable static element to their analysis. The time-varying covariates are 
assumed fixed for the duration of the (non)-poverty spell in question, but can 
vary between spells. Therefore while Stevens and Devicienti can model and 
simulate the multi-year poverty spells for different household types, they cannot 
allow for the effects of changes that take place during a poverty spell. Another 
specific problem with these hazard rate models is their inability to separately 
identify the effects of income events and demographic events that occur 
simultaneously, nor indeed the subsequent effects that these events have on each 
other. Both of these points highlight the inability of this approach to model the 
complex interactions between the demographic, employment and poverty 
processes. 
 
There are additional problems with models that incorporate event variables as 
explanatory variables. As Jenkins (2000) highlights there are econometric 
problems of simultaneity and endogeneity introduced when event variables are 
used to explain poverty transitions – the underlying processes are likely to be 
jointly determined. Moreover, it is difficult to disentangle the effects of an event 
once the new demographic and employment status is controlled for – what is the 
effect of the being in a state and what is the effect of moving into a state? There 
is also the problem that incorporating event variables constrains all of their 
effects to be contemporaneous – the event variable is 1 in the period that it 
occurs and zero in subsequent periods. However, it may be that the effects of 
events persist over time – there may be effects of losing a job for example, 
which continue to affect individuals over and above the effect of being 
unemployed itself. Furthermore if individuals anticipate events and change 
behaviour in advance this will further undermine the assumption of purely 
contemporaneous effects of events.  
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Finally, in any model based on analysing poverty spells directly, the arbitrary 
nature of the poverty line is important. As is often noted, it is somewhat 
arbitrary to turn a continuum of income into a poverty dichotomy and though 
Bane and Ellwood and others take measures to avoid spell endings and 
beginnings being recorded for small random income fluctuations around the 
poverty line, this remains a problem inherent in modelling poverty directly.  
 
c.  Markov models 
Cappellari and Jenkins (2004b) propose a model to complement both the 
exit/entry hazard rate approach and the components of variance model, by using 
an extension of a first-order Markov model for low income transitions. The 
model is estimated for working age adults in the UK (using British Household 
Panel Survey (BHPS) data – see data section) and is designed to reveal who is 
likely to enter poverty/remain in poverty and to derive estimates of state 
dependence. The probability of selection into initial state, the probability of 
sample retention and the low income transition are simultaneously simulated to 
deal with the initial conditions problem and the issue of potentially non-random 
attrition. The pooled-panel nature of the data means that there are multiple pairs 
of observations from the sample individual as well as observations from 
individuals in the same household, however these considerations are controlled 
for in the estimation. The model can be used to make a wide range of specific 
predictions of poverty rates, exit rates, re-entry rates, total time in poverty for 
individuals with differing characteristics.  
 
This paper provides a useful advance in modelling low income experiences. 
However, there are a number of issues. First, it may be that the restriction to 
first order dynamics only is inappropriate for the data. Second, the assumed lag 
structure (to minimise simultaneity issues) has current poverty status modelled 
as a function of lagged characteristics, lagged poverty status and attrition. This 
rules out the possibility of instantaneous effects of changes in characteristics for 
poverty status – for example changes in employment status are not allowed to 
affect poverty until the next (year) period. The model cannot tell us about the 
dynamics of poverty other than from one year to the next. However, these 
predictions rely on the stability of covariates – something that we do not expect 
to be the case, we expect that there will be inter-related changes in household 
composition and labour market attachment and the effects of these cannot be 
captured in this sort of model.  
 
d.  Dynamic discrete choice models 
Biewen (2004) has developed an alternative methodology for distinguishing the 
effects of state dependence from those of individual heterogeneity, in a model 
which also reveals the way in which past poverty can have an indirect effect on 
future poverty via feedback to employment and household formation decision. 
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Biewen highlights that in the context of looking at persistence in poverty, the 
necessary assumption of strict exogeneity of the regressors in a dynamic 
discrete choice model is unlikely to hold. This assumption is necessary to be 
able to distinguish a state dependence effect from the effect of unobserved 
heterogeneity. Previous poverty status which is used as a regressor for current 
poverty status is also likely to feedback to influence current employment status 
and perhaps marital status, thus violating the assumption of strict exogeneity of 
the regressors.  
 
In response, Biewen develops an econometric model which allows for feedback 
from poverty status to future employment status and household composition by 
jointly estimating individual poverty status, individual employment status and 
whether the individual lived in a one-person household. Comparing both the 
results of his model and the results from a pooled estimation similar to the 
Cappellari and Jenkins (2004b) model, which also tackles the feedback effects 
problem, with results from a model that does not allow for these effects, Biewen 
concludes that these feedback effects play a significant part in the dynamic 
poverty process. This is evidence of the importance of simultaneously 
modelling the demographic and employment processes which underlie the 
poverty outcome. 
 
There are however, limitations and problems with this model. The specification 
of the household composition equation allows only for the dichotomy between 
whether the individual lived in a single person household or not, therefore 
ignoring all of the other demographic changes. For example, in the model 
marriage, another adult joining the household and a child being born are all 
observationally equivalent, as are divorce and a dependent child leaving home. 
Though this may not be as much of a problem when trying to delineate the 
effects of state dependence from those of individual heterogeneity, for the 
purposes of unravelling the dynamics of poverty it is important to be able to 
distinguish between these events. 
 
Moreover, there is a question of whether poverty experience affects individuals 
as they may not know whether they are officially in poverty or not, it is more 
the effect of low income that is the driving force and this is proxied by an 
arbitrarily defined poverty status. Individuals in the regions just above and just 
below the line will experience the same effects but only some of them will have 
their feedback effects captured in the model, thus reducing its power.  
 
e.  Counterfactual decomposition methods 
This approach aims to provide an assessment of the relative impacts on the 
poverty rate of changes in a country’s demographic composition, wage 
structure, labour market attachment and welfare policy and benefit levels over a 
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period of years. Dickens and Ellwood (2001) provide such a decomposition of 
poverty rate changes for Great Britain and the US between 1979 and 1999 
(using CPS data for the US and FES data for the UK).  
 
In their methodology, Dickens and Ellwood estimate, for each year, what each 
sample members’ wages, work status, hours and benefits would be given the 
wage structure, labour market and benefit regime of 1979. From this it is then 
estimable what the poverty rate would have been if one or more of these 1979 
conditions had remained. So the first thing that Dickens and Ellwood do is 
apply the 1979 models of work, wages and benefits (including appropriate 
residual terms) to the actual characteristics of the sample individuals in each 
year since 1979. They then compute the poverty rate in each year given these 
circumstances. For each year, comparing this counter-factual poverty rate to the 
actual observed poverty rate reveals the effect that demographic changes have 
had on poverty from 1979 up until the year in question. Following this, wages 
are returned to their actual observed levels in each year, yet work and benefits 
continue to be held at their 1979 levels, and the poverty rate for each year is 
calculated under these circumstances. Now for each year, comparing this 
poverty rate with the previously constructed counter-factual poverty rate (which 
estimated the effect of demographic change) reveals the effect on poverty of 
changes in the structure of wages since 1979. This procedure is then continued 
to next see the contribution to poverty of changes in employment levels and 
finally of changes in benefits since 1979. 
 
Gottschalk and Danziger (2003) employ a similar methodology to delineate the 
relative impacts on the poverty rate of changes in mean income, demographics 
and income inequality, in the US between 1975 and 2001 (using CPS and 
PUMS data). Using US Census data Burtless (1999) looks at the changing 
income distribution between 1979 and 1996, and performs decomposition 
analysis to assess the impacts of changes in the structure of pay, family 
compositional changes and changes in work patterns and husband/wife earnings 
correlations, on overall income inequality.  
 
These descriptive decompositions are illustrative and show the importance of 
taking into account factors other than just income changes when analysing 
poverty. However, the main difficulty is that these methods have to make the 
assumption that changes over time in these different processes are exogenous to 
each other and poverty. The decompositions show for example, the ceteris 
paribus effect of changing employment patterns, but this fails to consider the 
implication for employment of changing household structures. It is unlikely that 
family structure and behaviours could change from the 1975 pattern to the 2001 
pattern with no effect on labour market participation, and vice versa. The 
approach cannot answer the question of what causes individuals to fall into 
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poverty, how important employment and family changes are and to what extent 
they cause and react to each other, and the process through which this results (or 
does not) in poverty. Also, as Dickens and Ellwood acknowledge, the order in 
which the counter-factual changes are introduced influences the results, 
indicating a further limitation of this approach.  
 
3. Modelling Framework 
We argue that a major benefit of our approach is the ability to tie an 
implementable empirical analysis of poverty to economic behavioural 
modelling. This is not possible with the currently used methodologies as 
outlined above. This section sets out a simple example of this.  
 
In contrast to this literature, the approach we take is to model the demographic 
and employment transitions underlying poverty transitions, following our 
previous approach (see Burgess and Propper, 1998; Burgess, Propper and 
Dickson, 2005). We argue that these transitions are stochastic, but with 
parameters that can be influenced by the agents. To be precise, we assume that 
individuals can invest to change the probability of a change of state. This 
investment is assumed imperfect in that the probability cannot be forced to zero 
or one. Individuals optimise the investment to maximise their expected utility 
stream. This section presents the framework for this analysis.  
 
The realisation of the transition processes locates the individual in one of a set 
of states – for example, ‘single, with no children and in work’. Let there be S 
potential states an individual can be in at any one time, denoted s. These are 
exhaustive and mutually exclusive. The transitions that we model empirically 
are the individual processes – that is, into employment, or adding children etc, 
but as we explain below, these individual processes are all estimated jointly. 
 
Utility depends on (net) income, leisure (or its inverse, employment (l)), marital 
status (m) and the number of dependent children (d). All of these bar income are 
incorporated in the definition of the state (that is, ‘single, with no children and 
in work’ defines the state and defines the amount of these factors the individual 
is enjoying). The utility individuals derive from their demographic and 
employment status depends on their characteristics (x) and unobserved 
heterogeneous preferences (ε). The income process for individual i in state s at 
time t is: 
iststiisty εθµ ++=     (1) 
where µi = βxi + ϖi is an individual effect depending on observed human capital 
and background (x) and fixed but unmeasured income relevant heterogeneity 
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(ϖ), and θst captures in a simple way the impact of state on income, and ε is 
noise. We keep this deliberately simple, since we do not empirically model the 
income process below. This is because we only have data on income from 1991 
onwards, unlike the demographic and employment state data for which we have 
a full recall history. As we will see shortly, we allow income to influence 
transitions, but simply substitute it out of the estimating equations using (1).  
 
Turning to the transition processes, we assume that they are influenced by the 
transition investments (γ) plus a process-specific parameter (α). The probability 
of moving from state k to state j per unit time is: ( )kjkjkj fp αγ ,=       (2) 
For example, this might be the probability of moving from employed to non-
employed. The cost of investing is increasing and convex in γ. The individual 
chooses her current investments to maximise her expected discounted lifetime 
utility, ( )∑ −
t
ttttt
t dmlcyU ,,,E δ , where c is the sum of investment costs. Each 
individual first computes her best future state at each moment in time. This will 
depend on her characteristics, her values of heterogeneity parameters, and her 
current state denoted S, and the common process parameters. Then she 
calculates the optimal level of transition investments trading off the costs and 
benefits. The solution to this problem makes the optimal investments γ* a 
function of the individual’s income, characteristics, the transition parameters 
and her current state occupancy. Note that this means that the model 
encompasses the idea of feedback from income to demographic transitions, 
though these are implicit and not separately identified here. Income is 
substituted out using (1) to give: 
);,,(* iikjkji g Σ= θµαγ        (3) 
where Σi is i’s current state across all processes (for example, “single, working, 
no children”). Individuals only observe current or time-invariant information. 
We assume that expectations are formed as projections of current information. 
Thus (3) represents a reduced form model combining both direct causal links 
and expectation formation. We substitute this into the transition functions (2) to 
obtain the transition rates: 
);,,(* iikjkji fp Σ= θµα       (4) 
This implies that the transition probabilities depend on: current state occupancy 
in all states (so for example, transitions into work may depend on the number of 
children), and (through µi) on observed personal characteristics (x) and 
unobserved personal characteristics (ϖ). 
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4. Data 
The primary dataset we use is the British Household Panel Survey. The first 
wave of the BHPS was designed as a nationally representative sample of the 
population of Great Britain living in private households in the autumn of 1991. 
Approximately 5,500 households, containing about 10,000 persons, were 
interviewed. These original sample members are re-interviewed each successive 
year, and if they split off from their original households to form new 
households, all adult members of these new households are also interviewed. 
Similarly, children in the original sample households are interviewed when they 
reach 16 years of age.  
 
In addition to providing information on respondents within the Panel survey 
period (1991 onwards) the BHPS asked respondents to provide detailed 
retrospective work, family and fertility histories in 1992. These retrospective 
data are matched to the within-panel data (dated to the month) to construct 
detailed marriage, fertility and work histories from age 13 for all adult 
respondents. Thus individual specific behaviour is modelled from this age and 
avoids the initial conditions problem normally encountered when estimating 
duration models based on the panel component only. We have created five 
detailed event histories for each individual: forming and dissolving a 
partnership, - having a(nother) child, entering and leaving employment. Overall, 
our dataset comprises the complete retrospective histories, plus merged within-
panel data for the period 1991-1996. These event histories are all at a monthly 
frequency. 
 
Turning to the definition of the demographic states, we consider marriage, 
employment and child birth. As cohabitation is an increasing form of union in 
the UK (either as a precursor to legal marriage or as a substitute), we define 
marriage as living in union with a person of the opposite gender, regardless of 
legal marital status. For the within-panel data we use the self-reported marital 
status, which takes the following categories: “married”, “living as a couple”, 
“separated”, “divorced”, “widowed” and “never married”. We classify 
“married” and “living as a couple” as de facto married, with the remaining 
categories being de facto not married. We use the same categories for the 
retrospective sample data.9  
 
                                           
9  BHPS data files BMARRIAG and BCOHABIT. We combine these so that for 
example the start of a pre-marital cohabitation marks the start of a period of union. 
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Individuals are defined as being employed if they are in full-time paid 
employment, part-time paid employment or paid self-employment. Individuals 
who are on long-term leave due to sickness are classified as not-employed.10 An 
individual is classified as changing employment status only if s/he moves into 
or out of paid employment. So in all the following examples, there is no change 
in recorded employment status: where individuals change employer, but remain 
continuously employed; individuals changing from full time to part time; and 
individuals moving from full-time education to job seeking. For the within-
panel data, we use an annual self-reported employment status and the wave-by-
wave employment history files from wave three.11 For the retrospective history 
we have each individual’s complete paid employment histories from the age 
that they first left full-time education up to 1992.12 We assume that all 
individuals are in full-time education and therefore non-employed at age 13. 
 
Births occurring during the panel years are constructed from the household 
record of the respondent.13 In the majority of cases, there is only one birth event 
in the household in a given wave; there are just nine observations with two birth 
events within one wave and one observation with three. The retrospective 
history collected in 1992 records the dates of birth of all the respondent’s 
natural children to that date.14 These data are recoded into a monthly panel of 
data covering the birth events in each individual’s life up to the time of their 
interview in wave two. These are then merged with the within-panel data to 
create one event history file, which records the conceptions of children, where 
the conceptions are assumed to have taken place 9 months before the birth date. 
We do not model children leaving home, so do not create a file of children 
                                           
10  Maternity leave does not count in this instance as being “in paid employment”. There 
are 1039 observations coded as maternity leave in the employment history datasets 
that we use, which represents just 0.8% of the total number of observations. 
11  Respectively the variable wJBSTAT and files wJOBHIST. The file contains details of 
all employment status spells since the 1st September in the year before the interview. 
In cases where individuals have employment changes the gaps between the annual 
wJBSTAT are filled with spells from the wJOBHIST files and recoded as “in paid 
employment” and “not in paid employment” as defined above. 
12  This is the BLIFEMST file. 
13  In each wave details of new household members are recorded in the dataset 
wINDALL. The variable wNEWHY provides information about whether the new 
household member is “new baby”. If this is the case the event is dated by using month 
and year variables.  
14  The details for an individual’s natural children are recorded in the dataset 
BCHILDNT. 
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leaving home dates.15 These data are also used to create stocks of each process 
as well as durations. In the case of stocks of children, we assume that children 
leave home at 21, so decrease any positive stock by 1 at the date at which the 
oldest child will be 21. 
 
For the panel component of the dataset we have good data on household 
income. Using this information, we create the net equivalised household income 
distribution for each year of the BHPS,16 with all household members included 
in the distribution. We set the poverty line at 50% of the median income within 
each year. Individuals have poverty status assigned for annual intervals. Having 
defined the poverty line, and determined poverty status, we then drop all of the 
observations that are not from our estimation sample of 2499 males and 2630 
females. For both the males and the females, the sample members range in age 
from 15 to 55, though we are interested in looking at their poverty status only in 
the years when they are 18 years old or older. Not every individual in the 
sample has full household income information17 in every wave of the panel 
from 1991-1996, therefore we have between 1 and 6 observations for each 
sample member. For some members however, none of the observations in 
which their household provides full income information, are years in which the 
individual is 18+ years old. For these individuals therefore we have no 
observations with income non-missing. This affects 79 males (3.15% of the 
original male sample) and 154 females (5.86% of the original female sample) 
such that the samples upon which we perform the poverty analysis comprise 
2420 males aged between 18 and 55, and 2476 females aged between 18 and 55 
years old, each with between 1 and 6 observations. For the males more than 
50% have income information non-missing in all 6 years, and for the females 
the figure is just under 50%. See the Appendix B Table B3 for the frequency 
distribution for each sex. 
 
In general the data contained in the BHPS is of high quality (Lynn 2003; Dex 
and McCulloch 1997). However, it is generally known that misreporting among 
men can be a problem, and this may be a problem both in reported fertility 
histories (Rendall et al 1999), as well as in job histories (Elias 1997). It is also 
                                           
15  This is simply because five processes is the limit of feasible estimation on a dataset of 
this size and complexity. 
16  We adopt the ‘before housing costs’ measure, equivalised using the McClements 
scale.  
17  We use derived net household income variables (hhneti and loctax) constructed by 
Jarvis and Jenkins; therefore in line with their rules, we only have household income 
information from households in which all household members gave full income 
information. 
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possible that recall errors will be a problem, although presumably less so for 
births and marriages. Given the already complex nature of our model, we are 
unable to make corrections for potential mis-reporting, recall errors or attrition 
(see Cappellari and Jenkins, 2004a, for an analysis of attrition in the BHPS).  
 
5. Estimation Framework 
Following Lillard (1993) we specify a model of related dynamic discrete 
choices, where these are defined over childbearing, union formation, union 
dissolution, employment, and non-employment. The model considers the 
dynamics of these processes jointly and allows the realisations of any of the 
related processes to enter as time varying variables in the other processes. Each 
of the processes is specified as a hazard function, which is conditional both on 
exogenous and endogenous covariates, as well as potentially correlated 
unobserved heterogeneity components. Note that we estimate these separately 
for women and men, so there is no issue of intra-household correlation of errors. 
The states are denoted as: )(tBn , a binary indicator taking value 1 if the 
individual has n children and 0 otherwise; M(t) is a binary indicator for marital 
status; and E(t) a binary indicator for employment status. All of these are time 
varying. The hazards are hjt , with j indexing the process, j = B, M, D, E, U are 
the hazards of a birth (measured at the time of conception), union formation, 
union dissolution, employment and non-employment respectively. These are as 
follows: 
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Individuals are assumed to be at risk of having the first conception from age 13, 
and are consequently starting the childbearing process (i.e. )(ln th Bt ) at this age. 
Once the first child is born, individuals become at risk of having the second 
conception, once the second child is born they become at risk of having the 
third conception, and so on. Thus conceptions are specified within one hazard 
function. The processes of union formation, union dissolution, employment and 
non-employment are similar in structure, except that being in a union and single 
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are mutually exclusive, as are employment and non-employment. At age 13, 
which is the start of the union formation and employment processes, individuals 
are single and not working. As soon as employment is obtained individuals are 
at risk of entering the state of non-employment, and as soon as they enter a 
union they become at risk of union dissolution. These events may be repeated 
several times.  
 
For each process j we include a control for the stock of each event (parity) jP , 
which implemented as dummy variables, and detailed controls for age effects, 
denoted as Aj(t) and defined as a piece-wise linear spline function. By 
specifying several node points – not necessarily the same for each of the 
processes - the formulation allows for a variety of patterns of duration 
dependence. The baseline hazard function, Tj(t), is defined in a similar way.  
 
We also condition on a set of assumed exogenous variables, jx . Note that 
although the BHPS panel contain a wealth of background information for both 
individuals and households, a very limited set only is available for the period 
covered by the retrospective histories, so limiting the number of exogenous 
covariates we can include in our estimation.18 We include completed education 
(5 levels), cohort of birth (in four groups – born in the 1940s, 50s, 60s and 70s), 
parental socio-economic status, ethnic origin, and a binary variable indicating 
whether the respondent lived with both of their natural parents from birth up to 
the age of 16.19  
 
For each of the five related processes we specify a random heterogeneity 
component. These will capture unobserved heterogeneity affecting (each of) the 
processes that is not picked up by the observed covariates. However, given that 
the processes are related, it is likely that there will be correlation between the 
unobserved heterogeneity terms across the five processes. The correlation arises 
from two sources. First, there might be unobserved characteristics, such as the 
level of family orientation of individuals and couples, which may impact all 
processes. Recall that we have a small observed state space because of the need 
to use the retrospective data; for example, in the retrospective data we do not 
                                           
18  Essentially, the retrospective histories only provide the date of demographic and 
employment events, There is no data, for example, on where the individual was 
living, their attitudes, their income or their health. To the extent that these are 
determined by socio-economic status, we do measure them by including parental SES 
and completed education. 
19  These controls are used because they measure important dimensions of socio-
economic status or, in the case of living with natural parents from birth until age 16, 
have been found to be important in earlier research on family formation and 
dissolution. 
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even know an individual’s region. Secondly, the introduction of endogenous 
covariates will generate correlation since these variables are realisations and 
therefore functions of the other processes. For instance, the union state M(t) in 
equation (5) is an outcome of the functions )(ln thMt  and )(ln thDt , which in turn 
depends on Mε  and Dε , respectively. Likewise, )(tBi  in equation (6) and (7) are 
outcomes of the function )(ln th Bt , which in turn depends on the unobserved 
heterogeneity component Bε . To allow for these various sources of correlation 
we specify the unobserved heterogeneity components to have joint normal 
distribution: 
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By integrating out over the correlated unobserved heterogeneity components, 
the observed completed durations and outcomes are independent, and can 
therefore be estimated by maximum likelihood techniques. 
 
Identification is ensured by the fact that all events are repeated, whereas the 
unobserved heterogeneity components are assumed fixed over individuals’ 
lifetimes (see originally Lillard (1993) and recently Steele et al (2004) for a 
similar identification strategy). The endogenous variables defining an 
individual’s current state are themselves realised outcomes of the processes. 
Crucially they always enter the other processes as lagged explanatory variables, 
which ensure identification of their parameters (Maddala 1983). For instance, a 
birth outcome will enter the employment and union formation processes as an 
explanatory variable, but always at a time prior to the next realised outcomes of 
the union and employment processes.20  
 
We could in principle still identify all the parameters and allow for separate 
parameters for different orders of each process by adding equations. For 
example, we could estimate separate hazards for first and all subsequent births, 
with the constraint that the error term be the same across both equations (to 
allow identification from the repeated nature of the events). This would mean 
adding further equations and restrictions to the already large system, and 
therefore we did not pursue this line of enquiry. 
                                           
20  There is of course the possibility of events taking place at the same time given that 
they are measured to the nearest month. But these are few and do not jeopardise 
identification. 
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Our specification of childbearing and union formation/dissolution deviates 
somewhat from the norm in the demography literature. It might, for instance, be 
more intuitive (and is more common) to formulate specific processes according 
to birth parity and the order of the union. The reason for this is not only that the 
baseline hazard is likely to differ by parity but also the explanatory variables 
may have quite different effects. Our focus on lifecycle relationships based five 
related processes comes therefore at a cost. The estimated parameters are not 
specific to each parity and order of events, so that (for example) the impact of 
education is the same for the first and all subsequent transitions into 
employment. In addition, the constraints on the size of the estimation problem 
means we cannot distinguish between either cohabitation and marriage, or part-
time and full-time work. Despite these drawbacks, however, we show below 
that the specification is able to replicate the empirical distributions rather well. 
 
We use the BHHH algorithm to estimate the model. The 5-valued normal 
heterogeneity distribution is approximated using Gaussian quadrature with 4 
support points for each of the 5 terms. The choice of the normal distribution 
over the gamma distribution or a non-parametric approach may not be trivial. 
While Heckman and Singer (1984) show that parameter estimates are sensitive 
to the choice of distribution, Ridder (1987) shows that this problem is much 
reduced if a flexible baseline is used, as we do here. We estimate this by 
maximum likelihood, using aML. 
 
6. Estimation Results 
This section briefly describes the key parameter estimates of the econometric 
model, displayed in Appendix A, tables A1 through A7. The results are 
discussed in greater detail in Aassve et al (2004). We do not discuss here the 
role of the background variables, education or the duration and age patterns, but 
focus on the interactions between the processes, particularly those that we 
highlight later as mattering for poverty dynamics, and the correlated 
heterogeneity. 
 
We start by considering the impact of marital status and employment status on 
child bearing. The results show that being in a union has a large positive impact 
on fertility events, and that the effect remains strong, controlling for unobserved 
heterogeneity. Being in employment has a negative impact on child bearing, but 
while the parameter estimate is highly significant, it is not large, implying that 
working is not a particularly strong deterrent to having children. The relatively 
weak effect most likely reflects the fact that part time and full time work are 
incorporated into the same category. It is possible, for instance, that women in 
full-time work have a much lower fertility rate than women working part-time. 
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The positive impact of employment for men on having children fits with 
previous findings. The parameter is highly significant, but again the magnitude 
is somewhat small. Note again that the parameter estimate here averages over 
all birth orders so the impact may be stronger for the timing of first birth, and 
even weaker for subsequent births.  
 
When considering the impact of child bearing on union formation, we see that 
the impact very much depends on the birth order. For instance, experiencing a 
first birth has a strong positive impact on forming a union, and this is the case 
for both genders. However, if the second birth is outside a union, this actually 
lowers the rate of union formation. The positive impact of the first birth event is 
consistent with economic theory, in that individuals consider a cohabiting union 
or a marriage more beneficial once they have acquired marital specific capital. 
However, there might also be normative forces at play, in the sense that 
individuals might feel a pressure to “legitimise” the child. The negative sign of 
second birth-event indicates that those who do not form a union after the first 
birth are at a disadvantage in the marriage market when they have the second 
child. The subsequent birth events have no significant impact on union 
formation. Work status has a positive and highly significant impact on union 
formation for both men and women, a finding consistent with most previous 
research (see Oppenheimer 2004 for a review).  
 
Turning to the union dissolution hazard, we find parameter estimates consistent 
with our expectations. The negative impact of first and second birth on 
dissolution indicates the role of children as marital specific capital.21 The impact 
of children is strong, even controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. The third 
birth event does not have any statistically significant impact on dissolution, 
whereas higher birth orders generally have a positive impact, but these variables 
are not particularly well defined due to small sample sizes. The impact of work 
status on divorce is not particularly strong, especially for men. For women, on 
the other hand, work has a positive impact only when we control for unobserved 
heterogeneity.  
 
The rate of entering employment is negatively associated with a first birth 
event. Although the impact is negative for both genders, it is considerably 
weaker for men. This negative impact for men is somewhat surprising as the 
financial costs associated with childbearing, and the traditional division of 
labour between men and women just after child-birth, would suggest a greater 
                                           
21  Our specification does not include duration splines for the birth events, so we do not 
examine the impact of the age of the children on the rate of dissolution (see, for 
instance, Lillard and Waite (1993) who show how dissolution depends on the age of 
the children). 
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incentive for men to enter employment. For second births, there is no significant 
effect for women, whereas there is a weak negative effect for men. For higher 
birth orders the negative impact for women and men (apart from the third birth 
order) persists. Being in a union reduces the employment rate for women, while 
for men there is no significant impact.  
 
Our estimates of the relationship between employment exits and childbearing 
show interesting, although not entirely unexpected results. For women, the first 
birth has a strong and positive impact on employment exits, whereas for men 
there is no significant effect. Bearing in mind that further child events represent 
increasing stock of children, we see that the second birth reduces the rate of 
employment exits. Again, the birth event does not have any impact on men’s 
employment decision. Marital status has a similar effect as the birth events. That 
is, women in a union have a considerably higher rate of employment exits. For 
men there is no impact.  
 
Estimates of the age and duration spline parameters are presented in Aassve 
(2004). The estimates of the parameters of the unobserved heterogeneity terms 
are reported in Tables A6 and A7. All of the standard deviations in A6 are 
significantly different from zero. Most of the correlations in A7 are positive, 
though there are differences between men and women in terms of magnitude. 
As events are repeated (as opposed to single spell processes) in our model, a 
positive correlation generally reflects that individuals who make frequent or 
rapid transitions in one process also tend to do so in the other processes. The 
estimates of the unobserved heterogeneity terms may also be influenced by the 
fact that we have not separated out cohabitation from marriage, part-time from 
full-time work and merge education with other non-employment spells.  
 
We find positive correlations between fertility, union formation and union 
dissolution, which indicate that individuals more prone to childbearing also 
make more rapid transitions in forming and dissolving unions, a result 
consistent with Upchurch et al (2002) for US data. The positive correlation 
between union formation and dissolution indicates that there are women (the 
correlation for men is positive but not significant) who both form and dissolve 
unions relatively quickly. The strong positive correlation between union 
formation and employment entry suggest that individuals more likely to form a 
union are also more likely to return to employment quickly. In contrast there is 
no strong correlation between union formation and employment exits, nor 
between employment entry and union dissolution. In addition, there is little to 
suggest that there are any common unobserved factors driving employment 
entries and exits. This is an interesting result, since it suggests that, those who 
tend to find employment quickly, conditioning on the observed covariates used 
here, do not necessarily have a higher rate of exiting employment. The estimates 
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also show that individuals who are more prone to union dissolution are also 
more prone to employment exits, which is again interesting given the positive 
correlation between union formation and employment entry, and between union 
formation and union dissolution.  
 
The unobserved heterogeneity terms are often smaller and less significant for 
men. This is particularly the case for union formation and dissolution, and 
fertility and employment entries and exits. The latter suggesting that men’s 
employment movements are less associated with changes taking place in terms 
of fertility (again conditional on the observed covariates). 
 
We evaluate the overall fit of the model in another paper, Aassve et al (2004). 
We use the model to simulate demographic and employment histories. 
Comparing these to the data, we find that a variety of different summary 
statistics of the duration and state occupancy patterns generally fit very well.  
 
7. Analysing Poverty I: Explaining poverty 
Given our empirical model of the behaviours underlying poverty transitions, we 
are ready to analyse poverty itself with the help of simulations. In doing so we 
first ask how well we explain poverty over 1991 – 1996 using this approach of 
focusing on demographic and employment status. This comparison provides a 
benchmark of the extent to which the correlated demographic and employment 
transitions themselves can explain poverty. Second, in the next section, we ask 
what matters for poverty – that is, which of the processes are most important 
and how that differs for different groups.  
 
The model is too complex for simple goodness of fit statistics, so we evaluate 
its explanation of poverty dynamics by comparing summary statistics from 
simulated lives with the equivalent from the data. This extends Aassve et al 
(2004). We first discuss the nature of the simulations, and how we assign state-
specific poverty rates to the simulants.  
 
a.  Simulations 
We simulate the lives of all of the original 2499 males and 2630 females from 
the BHPS, a total of 20 times each, giving 49,800 male simulants, and 52,600 
female simulants. These simulated individuals have the same background 
characteristics (ethnic background, cohort, parents’ characteristics, education) 
as the original sample. In contrast, the time varying variables will depend 
directly on the simulated paths, as they are generated from the simulation 
themselves. Simulation of the unobserved heterogeneity terms is relatively 
straightforward. Each simulated individual is given a value drawn from the 
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estimated five-dimensional joint normal distribution. This value is simply added 
to the log hazard, which is used to construct the inverted survival function 
(Galler 1997; Panis 2003). 
 
We follow standard principles for micro-simulations (e.g. Citro and Hanushek 
1991). We record the timing of their simulated demographic and labour market 
transitions from the age of 13 up to the end of the simulated panel in 1996, 
along with background information and non-time varying characteristics. We 
retain observations for each year that the simulant is 18 years old or older, 
during the years 1991-1996. This results in a male sample of: 45,800 simulants 
(91.64%) with 6 observations, 1680 (3.36%) with 5, 1360 (2.72%) with 4, and 
1140 (2.28%) with 3. The corresponding figures for females are: 48,940 
(93.04%) with 6 observations, 1020 (1.94%) with 5, 1200 (2.28%) with 4 and 
1440 (2.74%) with 3.  
 
Every individual is simulated from the age 13. From this age, we simulate the 
timing of 1) the first birth event, 2) the first union event, and 3) the first 
employment event. The lengths of the three simulated durations are compared, 
and the shortest is selected and taken to be the first event for this simulated 
individual. Based on the timing of the event the baseline duration dependence 
and the age dependency are updated. Starting from the time of the first event all 
other events are simulated. Again, the shortest of the three durations are selected 
and recorded. This procedure is repeated until the censoring date is reached. 
Being in a union and being single are taken to be mutually exclusive states as 
are being in employment and being not-employed. Fertility events, in contrast, 
are repeated and irreversible. The censoring date for childbearing was set to 45 
years of age for women, and 55 years of age for men, whereas the censoring 
ages for the remaining processes were given by individuals’ reported age in 
1999 – at most 59 years of age.  
 
b.  Poverty Assignment 
This modelling strategy captures the dynamics of the inter-related demographic 
and labour market processes that underlie the poverty outcome. We translate the 
simulated dates of events in the model’s five inter-related processes into a status 
at a point in discrete time, with status in January of each year taken to be the 
status for that entire year. For each gender we create a distinct state variable 
comprised of 16 different categories that are generated by the permutations of: 
de-facto marital status [0,1], paid employment status [0,1] and number of 
dependent children [0,1,2,3+]. Then for each simulant in each year, we assign 
[0,1] poverty status by a random draw with the probability of being in poverty 
determined by the within state poverty rate that year for the state that the 
simulant is in that year. This conditional randomization lacks any persistence, 
and so forces the only source of persistence to be from the demographic and 
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employment processes. Consequently, we do not expect to be able to fully 
match the poverty persistence in the data. This comparison provides a 
benchmark of the extent to which the correlated demographic and employment 
transitions themselves can explain poverty. 
 
Returning to the household income process from section 3, 
iststiisty εθµ ++=  
we define an individual as being in poverty if their income falls below a fixed 
line, ty . The chance that i, in state s at t, is poor is given by: ( )stitstist yF θµπ −−=      (12) 
where Fst is the distribution function of εi(s)t, with the variance allowed to 
depend on s and t. Averaging over all individuals in state s at t, we write the 
mean poverty rate as: ( )sstst µθππ ,=       (13) 
This depends on the state specific factor, and (in expectation) the mean person 
effect among the types of person typically found in state s. Thus assigning the 
empirical state-year poverty rate to each individual is a good approximation to 
the individual’s own likely poverty rate.  
 
By assigning poverty status this way, the model should necessarily fit aggregate 
poverty data as well as it fits the demographic and employment pattern. In a 
sense, the aggregate poverty summary data provide a weighted measure of the 
fit of the demographic and employment pattern, with the weights being the 
poverty rates. We also focus on comparisons of disaggregate and longitudinal 
poverty statistics from the simulants and the data.  
 
It is useful to consider the implicit treatment of assortative mating in this 
approach. Consider a woman who is in a union state. By assigning her the mean 
poverty rate of that state, we are implicitly assigning her the mean partner’s 
income of women in that state. So we are including a data-driven degree of 
assortative mating, albeit in a reduced form way. Note that when she transits 
between different union states, the change in the assigned mean poverty rate 
also can be interpreted as a change in mean partner behaviour.  
 
Ideally we would like to use the BHPS to generate the state poverty rates for 
each year. In order to generate reliable, stable poverty rates, we require 
sufficient numbers with household income non-missing in each state in each 
year. This is not possible in the BHPS due to cell size (see Appendix B for 
details), and so we are forced to turn to a much larger data set, the Family 
Expenditure Survey (FES). The FES is a household based survey interviewing a 
different cross section of approximately 6500 private households in each year. 
As the original focus of the FES was household incomes as well as 
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expenditures, the FES has the advantage that there are very few cases in which 
full income information for a household is missing. Therefore though the 
number of households involved each year is only approximately 1000 more than 
is the case in the BHPS, there are in each year around double the number of 
households with income information non-missing (see Appendix B). We 
construct the state variables for each gender in the FES to be precisely the same 
as they are in the simulations, and use the FES data for 1991 to 1996 to 
calculate the state poverty rates for each gender for each year, constructing the 
poverty indicator in exactly the same way in the FES as we do for the BHPS. 
Finally we construct the poverty rates for each state in each year for each gender 
(see Appendix B Table B1 for these state poverty rates in addition to details of 
the construction of the poverty rates).  
 
Clearly for this strategy to work well, poverty rates in the FES and BHPS must 
be very similar. In fact, this was more problematic than we had anticipated, with 
considerable differences in the lower end of the distribution of income from the 
two sources. Investigation revealed that these derive from differences in the 
income of non-workers. The line we took is set out in Appendix C. 
 
c.  Model Performance 
We start by comparing the simplest measure – the average poverty rate over all 
observations (N*T for real data, where N is the number of individuals, T the 
number of time periods, and N*T*R for simulated data, where R is the number 
of replications per simulant). Given our approach, this is essentially a weighted 
average of employment and demographic state occupancy, with the weights 
given by actual FES poverty rates. For women, the simulations produce a mean 
poverty rate of 16.39% (over 307860 observations) compared to 16.56% 
(11674) in the real data. For men, the mean simulated poverty rate is 12.91% 
(292060) compared to 13.61% (11450) in the data. This implied a close fit of 
the demographic structure.  
 
We disaggregate this comparison in Table 1, examining the fit by cohort of birth 
and age-band. In the table, each row represents a different cohort: the first row 
being the oldest cohort (born in the 1940s), the last the youngest cohort (born in 
the 1970s). The columns represent the different age-bands, each approximately 
10 years, from the youngest 18-29 years old to the oldest 50+ years old. The 
oldest individuals in the data are 55 in 1996, so this final age-band is around 
half the width of the other bands. In each cohort*age-band cell, the top figure is 
the overall poverty rate in this cell for the real data, with the number of real data 
observations in this cell below that; then below these is the overall poverty rate 
in this cell for the simulated data, and again below that we have the number of 
observations in the simulated data for this cell.  
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Table 1: Poverty Rates, by cohort and age-group 
Male 
Cohort and Age-group Analysis Top figure = male poverty rate, real data 
  Lower figure = male poverty rate, simulated data 
     
Cohort 18 to 29 years old 30 to 39 years old 40 to 49 years old 50+ years old
born in 1940s - - 11.54 9.86 
  n = 0 n = 0 n = 1976 n = 872 
      
  - - 9.90 8.69 
  n = 0 n = 0 n = 47060 n = 24460 
born in 1950s - 13.26 13.50 - 
  n = 0 n = 2021 n = 1385 n = 0 
      
  - 12.33 13.96 - 
  n = 0 n = 46620 n = 34740 n = 0 
born in 1960s 12.06 13.09 - - 
  n = 1866 n = 1635 n = 0 n = 0 
      
  10.75 11.60 - - 
  n = 47940 n = 42180 n = 0 n = 0 
born in 1970s 20.65 - - - 
  n = 1695 n = 0 n = 0 n = 0 
      
 20.94 - - - 
 n = 49060 n = 0 n = 0 n = 0 
 
The oldest cohort are born in the 1940s therefore by 1991, the youngest in the cohort (born in 1949) 
will be at least 41, and the oldest in the cohort (born in 1940) can be, by the end of the sample 
window in 1996, up to 56 years old – therefore this cohort will have individuals in the 40-49 years old 
bracket and the 50+ years old bracket. The youngest cohort however, born in the 1970s, can only 
possibly be in the age range 18-29 years old. 
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Female 
Cohort and Age-group Analysis Top figure = male poverty rate, real data 
  Lower figure = male poverty rate, simulated data 
     
Cohort 18 to 29 years old 30 to 39 years old 40 to 49 years old 50+ years old
born in 1940s - - 11.72 13.89 
  n = 0 n = 0 n = 2013 n = 979 
      
  - - 12.96 9.99 
  n = 0 n = 0 n = 52160 n = 27760 
born in 1950s - 17.25 14.51 - 
  n = 0 n = 1867 n = 1427 n = 0 
      
  - 18.82 18.01 - 
  n = 0 n = 45660 n = 39180 n = 0 
born in 1960s 16.90 19.75 - - 
  n = 2112 n = 1701 n = 0 n = 0 
      
  15.33 18.53 - - 
  n = 52980 n = 44820 n = 0 n = 0 
born in 1970s 21.52 - - - 
  n = 1575 n = 0 n = 0 n = 0 
      
 19.50 - - - 
  n = 45300 n = 0 n = 0 n = 0 
  
Looking at the poverty fit in this way gives a more detailed picture of the extent 
to which the model fits poverty. In each cell the simulated data poverty rate and 
the real poverty rate are close, in most cases the simulations under-estimate 
poverty in the aggregate. For males, the 18-29 years old band for the cohort 
born in the 1970s has the closest fit, the simulations poverty rate of 20.94% 
being just above the actual poverty rate in this cell of 20.65%. The greatest 
discrepancy between the real poverty rate and the simulations poverty rate is in 
the 40-49 year old band for the cohort born in the 1940s, in which the simulated 
poverty rate at 9.90% is 1.64 percentage points below the real poverty rate 
11.54%. For females, the fit is less good, but the largest discrepancies are in the 
least populated cells. The closest fit comes for the cell 30-39 years old and born 
in the 1960s, where the simulated poverty rate of 18.53% is just 1.22%-points 
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lower than the real rate of 19.75%. The greatest discrepancy comes in the cell 
50+ years old and born in the 1940s, where there is a 3.90%-point difference 
between the real poverty rate of 13.89% and the simulated rate of 9.99%.  
 
The aim of the model is to explain the dynamics of poverty. Table 2 compares 
the stability of poverty in the two datasets. The upper panel refers to the real 
data for males. The “Overall” section of the table refers to the entire N*T panel 
dataset, and replicates the overall poverty rate of 13.61%. The “between” 
column tabulates the poverty indicator, referring to individuals rather than 
individual-waves. The table shows that almost all men (95.45%) spent at least 
one year out of poverty. Of the 2420 males in the data, 721 (29.79%) spent at 
least one year poor. The combined percentage 125.25% reflects the dynamics, 
individuals spend time in both states, and provides a measure of heterogeneity 
amongst the males in terms of poverty. The higher the combined percentage, the 
less is basic heterogeneity: if everyone experienced both states the total would 
be 200%, and if no-one ever changed, it would be 100%. Thus the 125.25% 
figure reflects a strong degree of heterogeneity in the real data, with poverty 
concentrated on a group of approximately 30% of the males.  
 
The persistence of each state, both poor and not poor, is also reflected in the 
“within” section of the table. These show the mean fraction of time spent in the 
state, conditional on at least one observation with that value. Reading across the 
first row, of those men ever non-poor, they spend on average nearly 90% of 
their time not poor. This reflects the stability of non-poverty and the 
heterogeneity in the data, and reflects the extent to which non-poverty is 
concentrated on certain individuals. Similarly, conditional on an individual 
having one observation in poverty recorded, there is a 45.24% chance that if we 
choose at random any of his observations it will be in poverty. Again this 
reflects the stability of poverty, and a relatively high degree of heterogeneity in 
the data. The total “within” percentage of 78.76% is a measure of the overall 
stability of the poverty indicator variable;22 a figure of 78.76% shows that the 
poverty indicator is stable to a large degree. There is clearly a substantial degree 
of both persistence and heterogeneity in the real poverty data; the heterogeneity 
is reflected in the stability of the poverty indicator and by the concentration of 
poverty on certain individuals as shown in Table 2.  
 
                                           
22  It is the normalized between-weighted average of the within percents. 
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Table 2: Poverty Persistence 
Male 
 Overall Between Within 
 Real data Freq. Percentage Freq. Percentage Percentage 
in poverty   0 9892 86.39 2310 95.45 89.22 
                    1 1558 13.61 721 29.79 45.24 
Total 11450 100.00 3031 125.25 78.76 
   n = 2420   
 Simulated data Freq. Percentage Freq. Percentage  
in poverty   0 254356 87.09 49595 99.23 87.70 
                    1 37704 12.91 20384 40.78 31.93 
Total 292060 100.00 69979 140.01 71.45 
  n = 49980   
 
Female 
 Overall Between Within 
 Real data Freq. Percentage Freq. Percentage Percentage 
in poverty    0 9741 83.44 2315 93.50 87.60 
                     1 1933 16.56 811 32.75 49.44 
Total 11674 100.00 3126 126.25 77.70 
   n = 2476   
Simulated data Freq. Percentage Freq. Percentage Percentage 
in poverty   0 257413 83.61 52126 99.10 84.33 
                    1 50447 16.39 26278 49.96 32.78 
Total 307860 100.00 78404 149.06 67.06 
   n = 52600   
 
In each dataset only observations in which the individual is 18 years old or older are included.  
The “Overall” section of each table refers to the entire N*T panel dataset i.e. the overall male poverty 
rate is 13.61%. The “Between” column tabulates the poverty indicator, referring to individuals rather 
than individual-waves – showing for each state how many of the individuals ever experience that state 
e.g. 95.45% of the men spent at least one year out of poverty; 29.79% of the men spent at least one 
year in poverty. The higher the combined percentage (in the Total row), the less is basic 
heterogeneity: if everyone experienced both states the total would be 200%, and if no-one ever 
changed, it would be 100%. The “Within” section of the table shows the persistence of each state. 
These figures show the mean fraction of time spent in the state, conditional on at least one observation 
with that value i.e. reading across the first row of the male table: conditional on a man having one 
observation not poor there is a 90% chance that if we choose at random any of his observations the 
man will not be in poverty; similarly, conditional on a man having one observation in poverty 
recorded, there is a 45.24% chance that if we choose at random any of his observations it will be in 
poverty. The total “Within” percentage is a measure of the overall stability of the poverty indicator 
variable,23 the higher the figure the more stable the variable overall. 
                                           
23  It is the normalized between-weighted average of the within percents. 
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The lower panel of Table 2 has the corresponding figures for the simulated data. 
Looking at the “between” section, we see that almost every simulant 
experiences at least one observation when they are not in poverty. Of the 49,980 
simulants, 40.78% are ever poor, considerably greater than the 29.8% in the 
data. The measure of basic heterogeneity is 140.01% in the simulated data, and 
we see that we do not capture all of the heterogeneity that is in the real data 
where the figure is 125.25%; that is, the simulations have excess dynamics. 
Less heterogeneity means that poverty is less concentrated on certain 
individuals – in the real data poverty is exclusive to 29.79% of the males, 
whereas in the simulations more of the population experience poverty, they are 
more homogenous. 
 
The “within” percentages also reflect the lower persistence and the lower level 
of heterogeneity in the simulations. The fraction of time spent in each state is 
lower for the simulants, though only marginally for the non-poor. This again 
reflects the excess dynamics and not enough heterogeneity. The total “within” 
percentage of 71.45%, which is 7.31%-points lower than in the data, shows the 
relative lower stability of poverty in the simulations.  
 
The lower panels of Table 2 look at the stability of poverty amongst females in 
the real and the simulated data. Much the same story is true here, though 
generally the simulations capture a little less of the persistence in the female 
data. Again, comparing the data and the simulations, it is clear that the latter 
exhibit excess dynamics, and insufficient heterogeneity and persistence. The 
stability of poverty in the female simulations is lower than in the male 
simulations, and the female simulated figure is further from the data figure than 
is the case for males.  
 
Table 3 provides more detail from a longitudinal perspective on the distribution 
of poverty experiences. The simulated mean of 1.85 years in poverty for males 
is appreciably lower than the corresponding real figure 2.16 years. This also 
reflects the lower level of persistence in the simulations, and the excess of 
dynamics – more males are poor at least once in the simulations yet they are 
poor for a shorter time on average as the state of being in poverty is less stable 
in the simulations. We also see this heterogeneity in the distribution of the 
number of poverty spells in each dataset as shown in Table 3. In the real data, 
70.21% of the males never have a poverty spell; as noted, poverty is 
concentrated on approximately 30% of the males. In the simulations however 
only 59.22% of males never experience poverty. The proportion of simulants 
who experience one poverty spell is appreciably greater at 30.19% as compared 
with 23.33% in the real data, and the proportion experiencing two or more 
spells of poverty is approximately double the corresponding proportion in the 
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real data. Again, the story is the same for women, with too much homogeneity 
at the margin and excess dynamics. 
 
Table 3: Heterogeneity  
Male 
Poverty Experience  Real Simulated 
% of individuals who are ever poor after the age of 18 29.79 40.78 
  n = 2420 n = 49980 
Poverty Spells    
no. poverty spells   Percent Percent 
0   70.21 59.22 
1   24.09 30.19 
2   5.29 9.67 
3   0.41 0.93 
Total   100.00 100.00 
Distribution of Poverty    
2.16 1.85 Mean no. years poor after the age of 18 per individual, 
given poor once n = 721 n = 20384 
 
Female  
Poverty Experience  Real Simulated 
% of individuals who are ever poor after the age of 18 32.75 49.96 
  n = 2476 n = 52600 
Poverty Spells    
no. poverty spells  Percent Percent 
0  67.25 50.04 
1  25.32 34.83 
2  6.58 13.60 
3  0.85 1.53 
Total  100.00 100.00 
Distribution of Poverty    
2.38 1.92 Mean no. years poor after the age of 18 per individual, 
given poor once n = 811 n = 26278 
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Table 4 presents the poverty transition matrices for both the real data and the 
simulated data, thus providing a simple summary of the above findings. These 
show the rates of inflow into poverty and outflow from poverty for each pair of 
successive years during the period from 1991-1996. The rows of the matrix 
represent an individual’s poverty status in first year of the pair, the columns 
represent poverty status in the following year. For example, in the real data 
during this time period, in 60.39% of cases where an individual is in poverty 
one year they are also in poverty in the following year. Looking at the upper 
panel, it is clear that in the real data non-poverty exhibits a great deal of 
persistence: in 93.34% of cases, if an individual is not in poverty in one year, 
they will not be in poverty in the following year. The overall average annual 
inflow rate into poverty is consequently just 6.66%. The outflow rate from 
poverty is much greater at 39.61%, reflecting that poverty is less persistent than 
non-poverty – in only 60.39% of cases does an individual in poverty in one year 
remain in poverty in the following year.  
 
The lower panel of table 4 shows the transition matrix for the simulated data for 
males. We anticipate that we will not have enough persistence in poverty since 
by construction we do not allow for persistence in the income process. In fact, 
we find that this demographic and employment focused approach does yield 
significant persistence. The persistence in non-poverty of 90.85% for males is 
not far away from the corresponding figure for the real data. The persistence in 
poverty in the simulations is much lower at 37.15% than in the real data. The 
counterpart of this is higher dynamics, shown by the higher inflow rate into 
poverty and the higher outflow rate. Therefore, while, as expected, the 
simulations do show excess dynamics, it is clear that demographic changes can 
account for a substantial part of the persistence of poverty status.24  
 
For females, actual poverty is slightly more persistent than for males and non-
poverty slightly less so; alternatively, the inflow into poverty is greater for 
females, the outflow from poverty is lower. Again for females, the simulated 
data capture some of the observed persistence in non-poverty; women remain 
non-poor with a 92.5% chance in the data and 87.7% in the simulations. But 
again, the model does a poorer job of capturing persistence in poverty. 
To summarise, we have shown that this approach is able to capture poverty 
dynamics rather well, though for the reasons set out above, we do not generate 
enough heterogeneity and persistence.  
 
                                           
24  There is an issue of differential attrition in the real data, though obviously not in the 
simulations. 
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Table 4: Poverty Transitions 
Male 
REAL DATA poverty status year (t+1) 
  0 1 
poverty status        0 93.34 6.66 
year t                      1 39.61 60.39 
Total 86.30 13.70 
SIMULATED DATA poverty status year (t+1) 
  0 1 
poverty status       0 90.85 9.15 
year t                     1 62.85 37.15 
Total 87.25 12.75 
 
Female 
REAL DATA poverty status year (t+1) 
  0 1 
poverty status        0 92.46 7.54 
year t               1  34.92 65.08 
Total 83.33 16.67 
SIMULATED DATA poverty status year (t+1) 
  0 1 
poverty status       0 87.70 12.30 
year t               1  62.81 37.19 
Total 83.66 16.34 
 
In each dataset only observations in which the individual is 18 years old or older are included. 
 
8. Analysing Poverty II: Understanding poverty 
We analyse which demographic transition processes have the greatest effects on 
poverty. We explore this by changing certain parameters in the demographic 
hazards, and then running further micro-simulations, analysing the effects on 
different metrics of poverty when compared with these metrics in the base run 
case. This is an analysis of the empirical comparative dynamic properties rather 
than policy analysis.  
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Unlike the initial simulations, there is no real time element in these simulations. 
The only temporal structure in the simulated panel comes from the age and 
duration structure in the hazards. There is no comparison to real year poverty 
rates, so the primary requirement is that the time-constant state poverty rates for 
the different states are consistent in relation to each other. In this case, we are 
able to pool the observations across the FES for the years 1991 to 1996 and 
calculate the poverty rate within each state evaluated over the entire time period, 
providing more observations per state. Appendix B Table B2 shows poverty 
rates generated by averaging over 1991-1996.  
 
To get a clean measure of the effect that changing parameters has on various 
measures of poverty, we select for each gender, two different ‘type’s and 
simulate their lifetimes, 1000 times each, from the age of 13 until 1999. Each 
type was born in 1945 and therefore is 54 when we stop the simulations in 1999. 
Though we simulate their lives from the age of 13, we are interested in their 
poverty experience from the age of 18 onwards so each simulant has 37 
observations. The two types were chosen so as to provide a contrast in 
background and qualifications: 
? The type 1 male and female are advantaged: they are white, with high 
parental social class, their qualifications are ‘A’-level or equivalent, and they 
lived with both natural parents all of the time from birth until the age of 16;  
? The type 2 male and female are disadvantaged: they are non-white, with low 
parental social class, no qualifications and did not live with both natural 
parents for all of the time from birth up until the age of 16.  
Each type is also characterised by a once-only draw from the unobserved 
heterogeneity distribution, set to zero. 
 
a.  Simulation experiments 
We simulate lifetimes for these two types and both genders 1000 times each, 
and calculate averages of a set of poverty metrics. The measures that we look at 
for each type are: the mean poverty rate over all of the type’s lifetimes, the 
mean number of spells of poverty that a type has over his/her lifetimes, the 
mean duration of a poverty spell over his/her lifetimes, and the percentage of a 
type’s spells which are greater than 1 year in duration.  
 
Experiment 1 is the base run in which we use the estimated parameters. In all 
subsequent experiments, the changes made are all relative to the values of the 
parameters in the base run and only the parameters that the experiment changes 
are different to their values in the base run case. In the second experiment we 
increase the likelihood of experiencing a birth. We do so simply by increasing 
the intercept by 10%, thereby increasing the probability of a birth for all 
individuals irrespective of the number of children that they already have and 
irrespective of their position with regard to the other processes. Experiment 3 
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makes it more likely that an unmarried individual will become married, 
irrespective of the number of times they have been married, their employment 
and their fertility status, and more likely that a married individual will stay 
married, again irrespective of all other factors. To do this, we increase the 
intercept on the union formation hazard by 10% and reduce the intercept on the 
union dissolution hazard by 10%. Similarly, experiment 4 increases the 
intercept on the employment hazard by 10% and reduces the intercept in the 
non-employment hazard. Experiments 5 and 6 focus on cross-process effects. 
Experiment 5 increases the first two birth parameters in the employment 
transitions whilst leaving the union transitions unchanged. This has the effect of 
increasing the likelihood that an individual with children will gain employment 
and keep it. Finally, experiment 6 alters the employment parameter in the birth 
transitions, the union transition parameters unchanged. This has the effect of 
reducing the likelihood of having children whilst working compared with the 
likelihood in the base run experiment. 
 
Table 5 contains the results for the males. Each row of the table presents the 
results for a different experiment, and the columns are different metrics of 
poverty. The first four columns contain the values of these metrics for each 
experiment for the advantaged males, while the second four columns contain the 
values of these same metrics for the disadvantaged males. 
 
Reading across the first four columns of the first row, we see that in the base 
run model, the advantaged individuals have a poverty rate of 0.1139, will have 
on average 2.90 spells of poverty during the 37 years of their lifetime from the 
age of 18, that a poverty spell will on average last 1.45 years and that 26.13% of 
the spells that they have will be in excess of 1 year in duration.  
 
Looking at the results in the other rows for the first four columns, we see that 
for advantaged males, experiment 4 (raising the employment hazard and 
lowering the non-employment hazard) has the greatest effect across all 
measures of poverty. In this experiment, the mean poverty rate is reduced by 
almost half to 0.0628, and advantaged individuals will on average experience 
approximately one fewer poverty spells (1.91) than in the base run. Moreover, 
these spells will be shorter in length as reflected by both the reduction in the 
mean length of a spell – the mean is 1.22 years duration compared with the base 
run value of 1.45 years – and the reduction in the proportion of spells that are 
greater than 1 year in duration – down to 15.26% from the base run proportion 
of 26.13%.  
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Table 5: Experiment Results: Males 
 ADVANTAGED DISADVANTAGED 
 Mean Pov Rate 
Mean no. Pov 
Spells 
Mean Duration of 
Pov Spell, years 
% spells with 
duration >1year Mean Pov Rate 
Mean no. Pov 
Spells 
Mean Duration of 
Pov Spell, years 
% spells with 
duration >1year 
Experiment 1 (base) 0.1139 2.90 1.45 26.13 0.2452 5.00 1.82 39.24 
         
Experiment 2 0.0866 2.33 1.38 22.75 0.2114 4.52 1.73 37.46 
         
Experiment 3 0.1085 2.80 1.43 25.79 0.2441 4.95 1.82 38.32 
         
Experiment 4 0.0628 1.91 1.22 15.26 0.1414 3.44 1.52 27.81 
         
Experiment 5 0.0822 2.34 1.30 19.73 0.1815 4.21 1.60 31.81 
         
Experiment 6  0.1043 2.68 1.44 25.63 0.2313 4.87 1.76 39.04 
 
Experiment 1: base run 
Experiment 2: the intercept on the birth hazard increased by 10% 
Experiment 3: the intercept in the union formation hazard is increased by 10% and the intercept in the union dissolution hazard is reduced by 10% 
Experiment 4: the intercept in the employment hazard is increased by 10% and the intercept in the unemployment hazard is reduced by 10% 
Experiment 5: 0.5 is added to the two first birth parameters in employment transitions - so this makes it easier to work whilst having children. Marriage 
transitions are left untouched. 
Experiment 6: employment parameter is changed in the birth transitions - so this makes it less likely to have children when working.Marriage transitions are 
left untouched.  
Type 1: Advantaged - White; parental social class is high; qualification level is 4 (= 'A'-levels or equivalent); lived with both natural parents from birth to age 
16. 
Type 2: Disadvantaged - Non-white; parental social class is low; qualification level is 1 (=no qualifications); did not live with both natural parents from birth 
to age 16. 
All results for men; all counts and durations refer to years when simulants are 18+ years old and include censored spells 
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The experiment with the second greatest effect on advantaged males is 
experiment 5, which makes it easier to get and keep a job when there are 
children present in the household. The mean poverty rate is reduced 
significantly, down to 0.0822, as is the average number of spells of poverty, 
2.34 compared with 2.90 in the base run, and spell length. Experiment 2, raising 
the birth hazard, is the only other experiment which has a marked effect on the 
poverty experience of the advantaged males.  
 
The disadvantaged individuals start from a base run position where they have a 
mean poverty rate (0.2452) that is just over double the poverty rate of the 
advantaged individuals. On average they will experience two more spells of 
poverty than the advantaged, experiencing 5.00 spells on average during their 
lifetime from the age of 18. Moreover, at 1.82 years, the mean duration of a 
poverty spell is 25% longer for the disadvantaged and a significantly greater 
proportion of their spells of poverty are more than just a one-year dip into 
poverty – 39.24% for the disadvantaged as compared with 26.13% for 
advantaged.  
 
As with the advantaged, experiment 4 has the most dramatic effect, almost 
halving the mean poverty rate to 0.1414 and reducing the mean number of 
poverty spells from 5.00 to less than 3.5, and reducing their length. Experiment 
5 significantly reduces all of the measures of poverty and the same is true of 
experiment 2, though to a lesser extent. Experiments 4, 5 and 2 have similar 
effects on each type. In fact, the greatest relative reductions in poverty are 
achieved by advantaged, but the greatest absolute reduction is for 
disadvantaged.  
 
It is not surprising that experiments that increase participation in employment 
(experiments 4 and 5) have the most substantial effects on the average poverty 
experience of the individuals. The poverty experience of each individual is 
dependent purely on the state that they are in - the assignment to poverty 
depending on the state poverty rate for that state. We know that there is a 
substantial difference in the poverty rates between a state where the individual 
is employed and the corresponding state where he is not, and this is the case 
irrespective of the individual’s marital and fertility status. Therefore 
experiments which increase the individual’s employment hazard will 
necessarily reduce the mean poverty rate, number of poverty spells and duration 
of a poverty spell. Note that because of the various cross-process links, all the 
experiments can influence employment status. 
 
It is perhaps more surprising that the increase in the birth hazard has the effect 
of reducing poverty. Although the states in which individuals have children but 
are not married and/or employed have very high poverty rates, there is only one 
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state which has a lower poverty rate than the states in which individuals are 
married, with children and in employment. So the effect of more children is 
definitely bad from some starting points, but beneficial from others. Crucially 
the presence of children enters in the processes for employment and marriage 
formation. Therefore it must be the case that increasing the fertility hazard has a 
net beneficial effect on each type in terms of their other transitions, such that 
they increase their time spent in the low poverty state of married, employed and 
with children to an extent that the time that they spend in high poverty states is 
counter-balanced.  
 
Table 6 contains the experiment results for the females. Of the five experiments 
that we report in the table, the three that had the greatest impact for the males 
also matter most for females. However, the ranking is not the same, and there is 
more variation amongst the females as to which experiment affects which 
outcome the most. Moreover, for females there is a difference between the 
advantaged and the disadvantaged in the experiments that have the greatest 
effect on the outcomes that measure poverty experience. 
 
The first four columns of the first row give the base run position of the 
advantaged females: their poverty rate is 0.1293, they have on average 3.29 
spells of poverty during their lifetime from the age of 18 onwards, these spells 
have a mean duration of 1.45 years and in 25.11% of cases a spell is greater 
than 1 year in duration. Reviewing the results in the remaining rows of the table, 
we see that, as with the males, experiment 4 has the greatest effect on the mean 
poverty rate and on the average length of a poverty spell for advantaged 
females. In this experiment, the mean poverty rate is reduced by almost two-
fifths to 0.0807, and the poverty spells that the individuals do experience are 
more likely to be shorter in length. The mean duration of a poverty spell is 
reduced to 1.27 years and the proportion of spells that are more than a 1-year 
dip into poverty is reduced to 17.75%. There is also a reduction of almost one 
spell in the average number of poverty spells (2.36) that the advantaged 
individuals will experience. Of the other runs, experiments 2 and 5 have the 
greatest effects. 
 
The disadvantaged females start from a position in which their poverty rate 
(0.3250) is just over two-and-a-half times the poverty rate of the advantaged. 
On average they will experience 5.85 spells of poverty, two-and-a-half more 
spells than the advantaged. Moreover, the mean duration of a poverty spell is 
substantially longer at 2.06 years for type 2, and there is a sizeable difference in 
the proportion of spells that are more than just a one-year dip into poverty: 
41.33% for disadvantaged compared with only 25.11% for advantaged.  
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Table 6: Experiment Results: Females 
 ADVANTAGED DISADVANTAGED 
 Mean Pov Rate 
Mean no. Pov 
Spells 
Mean Duration of 
Pov Spell, years 
% spells with 
duration >1year Mean Pov Rate 
Mean no. Pov 
Spells 
Mean Duration of 
Pov Spell, years 
% spells with 
duration >1year 
Experiment 1 (base) 0.1293 3.29 1.45 25.11 0.3250 5.85 2.06 41.33 
         
Experiment 2 0.0814 2.29 1.31 19.86 0.2272 4.73 1.78 35.06 
         
Experiment 3 0.1255 3.36 1.38 23.51 0.3001 5.96 1.86 38.67 
         
Experiment 4 0.0807 2.36 1.27 17.75 0.2261 4.81 1.74 34.36 
         
Experiment 5 0.0903 2.56 1.30 19.52 0.2101 4.73 1.65 33.16 
         
Experiment 6  0.1164 3.01 1.43 23.08 0.3038 5.59 2.01 40.82 
 
Experiment 1: base run 
Experiment 2: the intercept on the birth hazard increased by 10% 
Experiment 3: the intercept in the union formation hazard is increased by 10% and the intercept in the union dissolution hazard is reduced by 10% 
Experiment 4: the intercept in the employment hazard is increased by 10% and the intercept in the unemployment hazard is reduced by 10% 
Experiment 5: 0.5 is added to the two first birth parameters in employment transitions - so this makes it easier to work whilst having children. Marriage 
transitions are left untouched. 
Experiment 6: employment parameter is changed in the birth transitions - so this makes it less likely to have children when working.Marriage transitions are 
left untouched.  
Type 1: Advantaged - White; parental social class is high; qualification level is 4 (= 'A'-levels or equivalent); lived with both natural parents from birth to age 
16. 
Type 2: Disadvantaged - Non-white; parental social class is low; qualification level is 1 (=no qualifications); did not live with both natural parents from birth 
to age 16. 
All results for females; all counts and durations refer to years when simulants are 18+ years old and include censored spells 
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The same three experiments that have the greatest effect on the advantaged have 
the greatest impact on disadvantaged though interestingly, and unlike the males, 
not in the same order. For disadvantaged it is experiment 5, which makes it 
easier to gain employment and remain employed when there are children 
present in the household, which has the most dramatic effect on all of the 
poverty measures, cutting the poverty rate by more than one-third to 0.2101, 
and reducing the mean number of poverty spells by more than 1 to 4.73. 
Furthermore, with a mean duration of 1.65 years, the poverty spells are on 
average 20% shorter, and are more likely to be just a one-year spell of poverty, 
the proportion of longer spells falling to 33.16%.  
 
Experiments 2 and 4 have a similar overall effect on poverty for disadvantaged. 
The reduction in the poverty rate is almost identical in each case: in experiment 
2 the poverty rate is 0.2272, in experiment 4 it is 0.2261, and these reductions 
are only 1.5 percentage points less than is the case in experiment 5. Therefore 
though they are not far behind experiment 5 in terms of mean poverty rate and 
number of poverty spells, experiments 2 and 4 have less of an effect on the 
mean duration of the poverty spells and the proportion of spells that are longer 
than 1 year. Again experiments 3 and 6 have very little effect on the poverty 
experience of the disadvantaged individuals. 
 
Changing the employment hazard has the greatest effect on the more educated 
advantaged. For disadvantaged, however, it is the experiment that makes it 
easier to work when with children that has the greatest effect. This makes sense 
in that, in the base run data, the disadvantaged spend more than double the time 
that the advantaged spend in states in which they are with children but not 
employed. There are large differences between the poverty rates for states 
where females have children and are working and those in which the females 
have children and are not working, therefore moving people from the latter to 
the former will have a great effect on the overall poverty status of the females. 
Thus given their much higher state occupancy in the children but no 
employment states in the base run, we would expect that making it easier to 
work with children would have a greater effect on the disadvantaged. 
 
Again it is less straightforward to explain why it is that the increase in the birth 
hazard intercept, experiment 2, would have a strong positive effect on poverty 
outcomes. However, it must be the case that the increase in time spent in 
married, employed, with children states as a result of the change in the birth 
intercept, in conjunction with the very low poverty rates in these states, is 
enough to counter balance the negative effect of being more likely to have 
children in the unmarried and/or unemployed states, such that the net effect is 
an unambiguous reduction in overall poverty experience. 
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In summary, parameter experiments relating to fertility, employment and the 
link between them reduce all measures of poverty for both types considered. 
And while it is the advantaged who get the greatest relative benefit, the 
disadvantaged benefit in all of these experiments and particularly in experiment 
5 which increases the chances of getting and keeping employment when there 
are children in the household. These experiments support the importance of 
employment in poverty dynamics. This importance arises both directly and 
indirectly through the impact on the other transition processes. 
 
b.  Illustrative simulated lives 
To illustrate the importance for poverty of inter-related demographic and 
employment transitions, Table 7 is a schematic representation of the lives of 
two pairs of male simulants from the base run micro-simulations. These are 
illustrative not representative. The first pair of simulants, A and B, are 
advantaged while C and D are disadvantaged. Each pair within each type have 
the same (zero) unobserved heterogeneity. The left-most column in the diagram 
shows the age of the simulant, and for each simulant (column) the entries in the 
cells in the main body refer to the demographic*employment state that the 
simulant is in at the age corresponding to that row. The shaded cells represent 
years in which the simulant is in poverty, with the column totals at the bottom 
giving the sum of years (out of 37) that each simulant is in poverty. Looking at 
the contrasting fortunes of these simulants, from the same initial position, 
illustrates the way in which these processes affect each other, and how this 
impacts on poverty experience. The only difference within each pair is simply 
the outcome of the stochastic process. This works through the five hazards 
representing the dynamic process to produce divergent outcomes. 
 
Considering first the two advantaged simulants, A and B, each simulant begins 
in the “not married, employed, no children” state and has two years in this state. 
A then loses his job and spends four years single and without a job or a child. 
He then gets married whilst unemployed and one year later has a child whilst 
still unemployed. He never regains employment and spends more than half of 
his observations in poverty after losing his job. Simulant A illustrates the 
negative impact of children on the chance of entering employment, and the 
consequences that this has for poverty.  
 
Due to the different poverty rates in the different states, if an individual has a 
child whilst not in employment, whether married or not, he will be in a state 
with a high poverty rate (63.5% if single, 48.6% if married). Therefore there is a 
good chance that the simulant will experience poverty - especially if he remains 
in such a state for a number of years. The presence of children adversely affects 
the probability of gaining employment, thus re-enforcing the poverty 
mechanism. We can see this at work in the results for A: of the 21 years that he 
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is married, not employed and with one child, 14 are spent in poverty. Once the 
child has left the household, though he does not regain employment, he is in a 
state with a poverty risk of only 20.5% and therefore has much less experience 
of poverty in his remaining observations. 
 
In contrast, after two years in the “not married, not employed, no children” 
state, B gets married in the third year. He remains employed throughout his first 
marriage, then gets divorced yet still remains employed for the duration of the 
time that he is single again. B then re-marries remaining in employment and 
crucially he is employed when he has a child. He loses his job for one period 
while he is married and has a child and dips into poverty during this one spell of 
unemployment; however, he then gets a job again straightaway after this and 
remains poverty free.  
 
A remains married yet never re-gains employment after losing it early on in life. 
In contrast, B gets married, divorces and later re-marries but crucially remains 
in employment for almost his entire lifetime, illustrating that with regard to 
poverty it is more important to maintain employment than it is to remain in a 
union. This is especially the case when children are born. 
 
Turning to the two disadvantaged simulants, we see that C has a short spell of 
unemployment to begin with but then he gets a job, gets married, has children 
and has no poverty experiences up to the age of 29. However, he then gets 
divorced and experiences poverty at this stage. C loses his job and has a 
prolonged period of unemployment; he still has 3 children in the household and 
spends all of the 12 years before he regains employment, in poverty. When he 
does become employed again, and lifts out of poverty, he loses the job 
straightaway and never gains employment thereafter. From this point he then 
spends 9 of his last 10 years in poverty.  
 
In contrast, D begins with a longer period of unemployment, during which he 
spends 4 years out of 7 in poverty. Then just like C, he gains a job, then gets 
married and then has children. Unlike C however, D manages to maintain his 
employment for the entire time from when he first gets the job until the end of 
his observations. As such, even when he has two children he only dips into 
poverty for two years out of 20. 
 
After gaining a job, D only spends three years in poverty, and it is only because 
he is relatively unlucky to have 4 out of 7 years in poverty when in the “not 
married, not employed, no children” state, while C is lucky not to experience 
poverty in any of his 3 years in this state, that the poverty experience of the two 
is not even more stark than it is. 
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Table 7: Example Simulated Lives 
 Advantaged  Disadvantaged 
 Person A Person B  Person C Person D 
Age State State  State State 
18 notM EMP 0 notM  EMP 0  notM    notE 0 notM    notE 0 
19 notM EMP 0 notM  EMP 0  notM    notE 0 notM    notE 0 
20 notM   notE 0 Marr EMP 0  notM    notE 0 notM    notE 0 
21 notM   notE 0 Marr EMP 0  notM  EMP 0 notM    notE 0 
22 notM   notE 0 Marr EMP 0  Marr EMP 0  notM    notE 0 
23 notM   notE 0 Marr EMP 0  Marr EMP 1 notM    notE 0 
24 Marr notE 0 Marr EMP 0  Marr EMP 1 notM    notE 0 
25 Marr notE 1 Marr EMP 0  Marr EMP 2 notM  EMP 0 
26 Marr notE 1 Marr EMP 0  Marr EMP 3 Marr EMP 0 
27 Marr notE 1 Marr EMP 0  Marr EMP 3 Marr EMP 0 
28 Marr notE 1 Marr EMP 0  Marr EMP 3 Marr EMP 1 
29 Marr notE 1 Marr EMP 0  Marr EMP 3 Marr EMP 2 
30 Marr notE 1 Marr EMP 0  notM  EMP 3 Marr EMP 2 
31 Marr notE 1 Marr EMP 0  notM  EMP 3 Marr EMP 2 
32 Marr notE 1 Marr EMP 0  notM    notE 3 Marr EMP 2 
33 Marr notE 1 notM  EMP 0  notM    notE 3 Marr EMP 2 
34 Marr notE 1 notM  EMP 0  notM    notE 3 Marr EMP 2 
35 Marr notE 1 notM  EMP 0  notM    notE 3 Marr EMP 2 
36 Marr notE 1 notM  EMP 0  notM    notE 3 Marr EMP 2 
37 Marr notE 1 notM  EMP 0  notM    notE 3 Marr EMP 2 
38 Marr notE 1 notM  EMP 0  notM    notE 3 Marr EMP 2 
39 Marr notE 1 notM  EMP 0  notM    notE 3 Marr EMP 2 
40 Marr notE 1 Marr EMP 0  notM    notE 3 Marr EMP 2 
41 Marr notE 1 Marr EMP 0  notM    notE 3 Marr EMP 2 
42 Marr notE 1 Marr EMP 1  notM    notE 3 Marr EMP 2 
43 Marr notE 1 Marr EMP 1  notM    notE 3 Marr EMP 2 
44 Marr notE 1 Marr EMP 1  notM  EMP 3 Marr EMP 2 
45 Marr notE 1 Marr EMP 1  notM    notE 3 Marr EMP 2 
46 Marr notE 0 Marr EMP 1  notM    notE 2 Marr EMP 2 
47 Marr notE 0 Marr EMP 1  notM    notE 1 Marr EMP 2 
48 Marr notE 0 Marr EMP 1  notM    notE 1 Marr EMP 2 
49 Marr notE 0 Marr EMP 1  notM    notE 1 Marr EMP 1 
50 Marr notE 0  Marr  notE 1  notM    notE 0 Marr EMP 0 
51 Marr notE 0 Marr EMP 1  notM    notE 0 Marr EMP 0 
52 Marr notE 0 Marr EMP 1  notM    notE 0 Marr EMP 0 
53 Marr notE 0 Marr EMP 1  notM    notE 0 Marr EMP 0 
54 Marr notE 0 Marr EMP 1  notM    notE 0 Marr EMP 0 
    
Sum      
poverty 18 1  22 7 
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These simulated histories illustrate how crucial it is to maintain employment to 
remain generally poverty free. This is even more so the case for the 
disadvantaged simulants who have lower education. We see starkly with these 
simulants how especially crucial the maintenance of employment is when 
children are in the household and particularly if there is more than one child. 
This ties in well with the results from the experiments in Tables 5 and 6, which 
shows the importance of the employment hazard, and the relationship between 
employment and having children. 
 
9. Conclusion 
We have pursued an economic approach to analysing poverty. This necessarily 
requires us to focus on the decision variables that individuals can influence, 
such as forming or dissolving a union, having children, finding or losing 
employment. These in turn are combined with an income process to model 
poverty. We argue that this indirect approach to modelling poverty is the right 
way to bring economic tools to bear on the issue. This is the central advantage 
of this innovative approach – it allows an economic analysis of poverty that 
current approaches do not. The implementation of this approach in this paper 
focuses heavily on demographic and employment states, and endogenous 
transitions between them as the driving forces behind changes in poverty. Once 
this method is established, the economic modelling can be made more elaborate. 
 
We construct a dataset covering event histories over a long window (for all our 
sample from age 13). Using this we estimate five simultaneous hazards with 
unrestricted correlated heterogeneity, and append a simple income process. 
Because the model consists of a complex set of dynamically inter-related 
processes, we evaluate it using simulation methods. The model fits the 
demographic and poverty data reasonably well. As expected, we capture a lot 
but not all of the heterogeneity and persistence in longitudinal poverty 
experiences.  
 
Given the model, we investigate the important parameters and processes for 
differences in individuals’ poverty likelihood. Getting and keeping a job show 
up as having a substantial impact on poverty for most groups. Interestingly, for 
disadvantaged women, the most important parameter is that governing the 
difficulty of securing a job whilst there are young children in the household. We 
do not push this all too far given that this is not detailed policy analysis, but it 
does give some support to those who support anti-poverty policies based on 
‘work first’ and the importance of affordable child care.  
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There are a number of caveats to bear in mind in this implementation. Whilst 
the estimation is generally unrestrictive in terms of temporal structure and 
cross-process correlation, computational complexity forces some decisions on 
us. For example, not being able to fully distinguish between first and subsequent 
spells of the hazard processes is likely to be a restriction. Second, we adopted a 
relatively simple income process to allow us to focus on employment and 
demographics. This means that we do not address issues such as the low pay/no 
pay cycle. Third, whilst we include and then substitute out income from the 
demographic transition processes, there may be second order effects on these 
from more complex dynamic patterns in income (such as prolonged spells of 
low income) that we do not capture. One area for further work is to introduce 
some persistence into our simple income process. 
 
Nevertheless, we believe that this paper has shown this to be a useful 
framework for analysing poverty. Unlike the other major approaches, it is 
coherent with an economic viewpoint as we analyse variables that individuals 
make decisions on, and we take seriously the household basis for poverty. It 
focuses attention on the dynamic processes that are most important for initiating 
and ending spells of poverty, and offers scope for further work to develop 
specific processes in more detail.  
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Appendix A: Estimation Results 
Table A1: Fertility Transitions 
 Women Men 
BIRTH ORDER 2 -0.9432 *** -1.2704 *** 
 (0.1221) (0.1672) 
BIRTH ORDER 3 -2.7509 *** -2.9772 *** 
 (0.1444) (0.2044) 
BIRTH ORDER 4,5 & 6 -3.8723 *** -3.8089 *** 
 (0.1888) (0.2559) 
COHORT 1950 – 1960 -0.0275 -0.0626 
 (0.0636) (0.0689) 
COHORT 1960 – 1970 -0.3909 *** -0.5677 *** 
 (0.0686) (0.0832) 
COHORT 1970 + -0.9392 *** -0.8396 *** 
 (0.1315) (0.1753) 
0.2832 *** 0.2260 *** DID NOT LIVE W BOTH NATURAL 
PARENTS FROM BIRTH UP TO AGE 16 (0.0701) (0.0832) 
FATHER PROFESSIONAL OCC. -0.1409 ** -0.1082 
 (0.0700) (0.0718) 
MOTHER PROFESSIONAL OCC. -0.0407 0.0380 
 (0.0927) (0.0997) 
ETHNIC ORIGIN 0.3133 *** 0.4530 *** 
 (0.1170) (0.1346) 
SUB O-LEVEL QUALIFICATION -0.3583 *** 0.0177 
 (0.0917) (0.1108) 
O-LEVELS OR EQUIVALENT -0.6063 *** -0.1186 
 (0.0813) (0.0885) 
A – LEVELS OR EQUIVALENT -0.7259 *** -0.2454 *** 
 (0.0804) (0.0799) 
HIGHER QUALIFICATION -0.9509 *** -0.4605 *** 
 (0.0998) (0.1071) 
MARRIED OR COHABITING 1.7611 *** 2.0787 *** 
 (0.0598) (0.0782) 
WORKING (INCL. PART TIME) -0.1885 *** 0.3832 *** 
 (0.0505) (0.0893) 
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Table A2: Union Transitions 
 Women Men 
MARRIAGE ORDER 2 -1.3474 *** -0.4008 
 (0.2238) (0.2981) 
MARRIAGE ORDER 3 OR 4 -1.8064 *** -0.7455 ** 
 (0.2945) (0.3662) 
COHORT 1950 – 1960 0.1907 ** -0.0640 
 (0.0772) (0.0777) 
COHORT 1960 – 1970 -0.1526 ** -0.1149 
 (0.0778) (0.0827) 
COHORT 1970 + -0.5513 *** -0.7884 *** 
 (0.1079) (0.1226) 
0.2767 *** 0.2455 *** DID NOT LIVE W BOTH NATURAL 
PARENTS FROM BIRTH UP TO AGE 16 (0.0777) (0.0856) 
FATHER PROFESSIONAL OCC. -0.0070 -0.0381 
 (0.0734) (0.0736) 
MOTHER PROFESSIONAL OCC. -0.0278 -0.0962 
 (0.0956) (0.1068) 
ETHNIC ORIGIN -0.4329 *** -0.4978 *** 
 (0.1217) (0.1474) 
SUB O-LEVEL QUALIFICATION -0.2824 ** 0.1596 
 (0.1113) (0.1242) 
O-LEVELS OR EQUIVALENT -0.2774 *** 0.3215 *** 
 (0.0877) (0.1049) 
A – LEVELS OR EQUIVALENT -0.2843 *** 0.2503 *** 
 (0.0873) (0.0884) 
HIGHER QUALIFICATION -0.6370 *** 0.0548 
 (0.1063) (0.1073) 
FIRST BIRTH 0.9186 *** 1.2512 *** 
 (0.0661) (0.0849) 
SECOND BIRTH -0.6107 *** -0.9079 *** 
 (0.1019) (0.1276) 
THIRD BIRTH -0.2261 -0.0149 
 (0.1493) (0.2388) 
FOURTH BIRTH -0.0552 -0.2928 
 (0.2712) (0.4548) 
FIFTH & SIXTH BIRTH -0.0174 -0.8058 
 (0.3801) (0.6903) 
WORKING (INCL. PART TIME) 0.5405 *** 0.7354 *** 
 (0.0633) (0.0880) 
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Table A3: Dissolution Transitions 
 Women Men 
DISSOLUTION ORDER 2 -0.3074  
 (0.3061) (0.2895) 
DISSOLUTION ORDER 3 OR 4 -0.0294 0.0841 
 (0.5252) (0.5049) 
COHORT 1950 – 1960 0.6332 *** 0.6654 *** 
 (0.1256) (0.1401) 
COHORT 1960 – 1970 1.1336 *** 1.3202 *** 
 (0.1478) (0.1815) 
COHORT 1970 + 1.8736 *** 1.6712 *** 
 (0.2204) (0.2724) 
0.5218 *** 0.3572 *** DID NOT LIVE W BOTH NATURAL PARENTS 
FROM BIRTH UP TO AGE 16 (0.1189) (0.1322) 
FATHER PROFESSIONAL OCC. 0.1125 0.0740 
 (0.1048) (0.1193) 
MOTHER PROFESSIONAL OCC. 0.0306 0.0788 
 (0.1401) (0.1564) 
ETHNIC ORIGIN 0.1260 -0.0644 
 (0.1848) (0.2763) 
SUB O-LEVEL QUALIFICATION -0.1898 0.1501 
 (0.1614) (0.2244) 
O-LEVELS OR EQUIVALENT -0.1865 0.1194 
 (0.1367) (0.1775) 
A – LEVELS OR EQUIVALENT -0.0031 0.1431 
 (0.1308) (0.1541) 
HIGHER QUALIFICATION -0.0828 0.1443 
 (0.1526) (0.1752) 
FIRST BIRTH -0.2409 ** -0.5765 *** 
 (0.1114) (0.1219) 
SECOND BIRTH -0.2831 ** -0.3995 *** 
 (0.1190) (0.1451) 
THIRD BIRTH 0.0041 -0.3401 
 (0.1324) (0.2157) 
FOURTH BIRTH 0.2017 0.2630 
 (0.2044) (0.2954) 
WORKING (INCL. PART TIME) 0.2215 ** 0.0831 
 (0.0889) (0.1352) 
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Table A4: Employment Entries 
 Women Men 
EMPLOYMENT ORDER 2 -0.4763 *** -0.9114 *** 
 (0.0761) (0.1240) 
EMPLOYMENT ORDER 3 -0.1767 * -0.8783 *** 
 (0.0993) (0.1454) 
EMPLOYMENT ORDER 4 OR HIGHER 0.0151 -0.9520 *** 
 (0.1190) (0.1544) 
COHORT 1950 – 1960 0.1779 *** -0.1940 *** 
 (0.0390) (0.0508) 
COHORT 1960 – 1970 0.0223 -0.3944 *** 
 (0.0445) (0.0608) 
COHORT 1970 + -0.0643 -0.3791 *** 
 (0.0635) (0.0694) 
0.0634 0.0177 DID NOT LIVE W BOTH NATURAL 
PARENTS FROM BIRTH UP TO AGE 16 (0.0410) (0.0582) 
FATHER PROFESSIONAL OCC. -0.1040 *** -0.1384 *** 
 (0.0379) (0.0532) 
MOTHER PROFESSIONAL OCC. -0.1066 ** -0.0313 
 (0.0516) (0.0744) 
ETHNIC ORIGIN -0.4454 *** -0.5195 *** 
 (0.0702) (0.0967) 
SUB O-LEVEL QUALIFICATION 0.1536 *** 0.0136 
 (0.0550) (0.0796) 
O-LEVELS OR EQUIVALENT 0.1910 *** 0.0790 
 (0.0491) (0.0646) 
A – LEVELS OR EQUIVALENT 0.0719 -0.0908 
 (0.0472) (0.0564) 
HIGHER QUALIFICATION -0.3384 *** -0.9084 *** 
 (0.0533) (0.0862) 
FIRST BIRTH -0.8402 *** -0.2186 *** 
 (0.0529) (0.0783) 
SECOND BIRTH 0.0355 -0.1927 ** 
 (0.0554) (0.0835) 
THIRD BIRTH -0.2550 *** -0.0100 
 (0.0652) (0.1041) 
FOURTH BIRTH -0.3277 *** -0.6219 *** 
 (0.1119) (0.1547) 
FIFTH & SIXTH BIRTH -0.5858 ** -0.4822 
 (0.2462) (0.4064) 
MARRIED OR COHABITING -0.2875 *** 0.0539 
 (0.0466) (0.0659) 
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Table A5: Employment Exits 
 Women Men 
UNEMPLYMENT ORDER 2 -1.2456 *** -0.1405 
 (0.0773) (0.1211) 
NON-EMPLOYMENT ORDER 3 -1.3764 *** -0.2159 
 (0.1106) (0.1854) 
NON-EMPLOYMENT ORDER 4 OR HIGHER -1.4982 *** -0.3358 
 (0.1442) (0.2419) 
COHORT 1950 – 1960 0.2001 ** 0.6976 *** 
 (0.0808) (0.0957) 
COHORT 1960 – 1970 0.4847 *** 1.4182 *** 
 (0.0831) (0.1151) 
COHORT 1970 + 1.3409 *** 2.2532 *** 
 (0.1057) (0.1440) 
0.1886 ** 0.0494 DID NOT LIVE W BOTH NATURAL PARENTS 
FROM BIRTH UP TO AGE 16 (0.0782) (0.0874) 
FATHER PROFESSIONAL OCC. -0.0935 -0.1997 ** 
 (0.0719) (0.0835) 
MOTHER PROFESSIONAL OCC. -0.1494 -0.0103 
 (0.0939) (0.1112) 
ETHNIC ORIGIN 0.1354 0.1259 
 (0.1271) (0.1536) 
SUB O-LEVEL QUALIFICATION -0.2330 ** -0.2912 ** 
 (0.1093) (0.1376) 
O-LEVELS OR EQUIVALENT -0.6139 *** -0.4298 *** 
 (0.0976) (0.1093) 
A – LEVELS OR EQUIVALENT -0.4706 *** -0.3978 *** 
 (0.0911) (0.0970) 
HIGHER QUALIFICATION -0.3115 *** -0.2671 ** 
 (0.1012) (0.1339) 
FIRST BIRTH 2.0790 *** -0.0181 
 (0.0512) (0.0826) 
SECOND BIRTH -1.0061 *** -0.0155 
 (0.0564) (0.0944) 
THIRD BIRTH -0.2559 *** 0.0457 
 (0.0810) (0.1183) 
FOURTH BIRTH -0.0731 0.3016 
 (0.1268) (0.2012) 
FIFTH & SIXTH BIRTH 0.3840 0.4655 
 (0.2553) (0.4355) 
MARRIED OR COHABITING 0.8027 *** -0.0787 
 (0.0510) (0.0747) 
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Table A6: S. D. of Unobserved Heterogeneity Terms 
 WOMEN  MEN 
FERTILITY: 0.9430 ***  0.7913 *** 
 (0.0463)  (0.0696) 
UNION FORMATION: 0.8396 ***  0.7776 *** 
 (0.0703)  (0.0868) 
UNION DISSOLUTION: 0.8333 ***  0.8036 *** 
 (0.2175)  (0.2268) 
EMPLOYMENT: 0.2214 ***  0.4221 *** 
 (0.0454)  (0.0416) 
NON-EMPLOYMENT: 0.9711 ***  0.8517 *** 
 (0.0410)  (0.1005) 
 
Table A7: Correlations between Unobserved Heterogeneity Terms 
 WOMEN  MEN 
FERTILITY & UNION FORMATION: 0.4809 ***  0.5460 *** 
 (0.0567)  (0.0886) 
FERTILITY & DISSOLUTION: 0.2525 **  0.2852 * 
 (0.0989)  (0.1500) 
FERTILITY & EMPLOYMENT ENTRY: 0.4548 ***  0.2717 *** 
 (0.1326)  (0.0890) 
FERTILITY & EMPLOYMENT EXITS: 0.5632 ***  0.1239 * 
 (0.0400)  (0.0693) 
UNION FORMATION & DISSOLUTION: 0.5135 *** 
(0.1228) 
 0.3221 
(0.2094) 
    
UNION & EMPLOYMENT ENTRY: 0.7789 ***  0.6166 *** 
 (0.1395)  (0.0992) 
UNION & EMPLOYMENT EXITS: 0.0876 *  -0.0806 
 (0.0487)  (0.0721) 
DISSOLUTION & EMPLOYMENT ENTRY: 0.0031 
(0.1652) 
 -0.2513 
(0.1641) 
    
DISSOLUTION & EMPLOYMENT EXITS: 0.5088 *** 
(0.1142) 
 0.5262 *** 
(0.1350) 
    
EMPLOYMENT ENTRY & EMPLOYMENT 
EXITS: 
0.1113 
(0.1379) 
 -0.0451 
(0.1145) 
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Appendix B: Poverty Assignment Tables 
Table B1: Poverty Rates used in the Simulations, by year and state 
MALES 
state/year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
notM notE 0 54.9 56.5 54.5 57.9 58.4 55.3 
notM notE 1 64.0 74.8 76.0 72.5 69.9 77.2 
notM notE 2 70.7 82.5 83.8 79.9 77.1 85.2 
notM notE 3+ 89.4 104.4 106.0 101.2 97.6 107.8 
notM EMP 0 3.1 3.5 3.2 3.8 2.5 3.0 
notM EMP 1 3.4 3.9 4.0 3.8 3.7 4.1 
notM EMP 2 4.9 5.7 5.8 5.5 5.3 5.9 
notM EMP 3+ 16.1 18.8 19.1 18.2 17.6 19.4 
Marr notE 0 22.5 20.2 21.1 19.6 19.0 20.7 
Marr notE 1 47.5 50.0 53.1 52.4 43.3 46.3 
Marr notE 2 63.3 66.7 53.6 52.0 69.1 76.3 
Marr notE 3+ 84.0 98.0 99.6 95.0 91.7 101.3 
Marr EMP 0 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.5 1.4 0.6 
Marr EMP 1 3.2 3.5 3.0 2.5 3.1 2.9 
Marr EMP 2 7.5 6.1 6.6 5.8 5.7 6.0 
Marr EMP 3+ 16.3 14.8 19.9 15.2 17.2 21.1 
 
FEMALES 
state/year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
notM notE 0 49.0 45.8 47.4 54.2 43.8 54.8 
notM notE 1 75.7 77.7 74.6 82.5 81.3 86.7 
notM notE 2 83.9 95.1 80.0 88.7 87.2 102.2 
notM notE 3+ 94.4 107.0 112.8 109.5 106.0 114.9 
notM EMP 0 6.5 3.4 3.5 2.9 4.0 3.5 
notM EMP 1 18.1 19.6 21.6 20.9 20.3 25.0 
notM EMP 2 28.6 32.5 34.2 33.2 32.1 34.9 
notM EMP 3+ 44.9 50.9 53.7 52.1 50.4 54.7 
Marr notE 0 8.8 9.7 10.6 12.0 14.1 12.6 
Marr notE 1 20.6 20.3 22.6 23.1 23.3 21.5 
Marr notE 2 26.6 31.5 27.2 28.9 29.6 31.8 
Marr notE 3+ 42.9 49.5 51.9 49.2 47.0 62.1 
Marr EMP 0 1.2 1.3 1.9 1.8 1.3 0.8 
Marr EMP 1 1.1 3.2 3.3 3.3 2.1 4.4 
Marr EMP 2 3.4 5.0 4.1 2.6 3.2 4.5 
Marr EMP 3+ 11.9 5.9 10.8 12.1 15.3 12.0 
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As is shown in Tables B4, there are states in which even in the FES, the 
numbers in the state in each year are insufficient to give a non-noisy poverty 
rate. We consider 100 observations sufficient to provide a non-noisy poverty 
rate. This is inevitable given that, for example, being a single male working 
father of 3 children is not very likely in any year in a sample based dataset, 
especially when the sample sizes are cut down further by the requirements of 
full income information in each year. However, in almost every state-year we 
have more observations in the FES data, considerably more so in the case of the 
married states.  
 
In the cases in which there are insufficient observations in a state, we impute the 
state poverty rate by taking the ratio of the mean poverty rate in the state across 
all years to the mean poverty across all states and all years, and multiply this by 
the mean poverty rate (across all states) in the year in question:  
 
t
s
st ΠΠ
Π=Π *
 
 
This procedure is used to obtain the poverty rates in each year for the following 
male states:  
not married, not employed, 1 child;  
not married, not employed 2 children;  
not married, not employed, 3+ children;  
not married, employed, 1 child; 
not married, employed, 2 children; 
not married, employed, 3+ children; 
married, not employed, 3+ children. 
The procedure is also used to obtain the poverty rate in 1991 only for the state: 
married, not employed, 1 child; and is used in the years 1991, 1995 and 1996 to 
obtain the poverty rate for the state: married, not employed, 2 children. 
The states for the females that rely on this procedure in every year are: 
not married, not employed, 3+ children; 
not married, employed, 2 children; 
not married, employed, 3+ children. 
The procedure is also used to obtain the poverty rate for the state: not married, 
not employed, 2 children, in 1991, 1992 and 1996; and in 1991, 1993, 1994 and 
1995 for the state: not married, employed, 1 child. 
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Table B2: Number of Observations and Poverty Rates by state, used for the 
second set of micro-simulations 
MALES 
State Poverty Rate No. obs
notM notE 0 56.3 1138 
notM notE 1 63.5 74 
notM notE 2 78.6 28 
notM notE 3+ 94.7 19 
notM EMP 0 3.2 2275 
notM EMP 1 19.2 100 
notM EMP 2 21.9 49 
notM EMP 3+ 43.5 10 
Marr notE 0 20.5 1328 
Marr notE 1 48.6 591 
Marr notE 2 59.5 603 
Marr notE 3+ 81.3 497 
Marr EMP 0 1.2 6516 
Marr EMP 1 3.0 3479 
Marr EMP 2 6.3 4319 
Marr EMP 3+ 17.4 1791 
Total  22817 
 
FEMALES 
State Poverty Rate No. obs
notM notE 0 49.1 903 
notM notE 1 79.8 672 
notM notE 2 84.2 551 
notM notE 3+ 92.2 371 
notM EMP 0 3.9 2035 
notM EMP 1 23.6 564 
notM EMP 2 26.8 392 
notM EMP 3+ 53.3 122 
Marr notE 0 10.9 2547 
Marr notE 1 21.8 1450 
Marr notE 2 29.2 1751 
Marr notE 3+ 50.6 1163 
Marr EMP 0 1.4 5297 
Marr EMP 1 2.9 2620 
Marr EMP 2 3.8 3171 
Marr EMP 3+ 11.4 1125 
Total  24734 
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As we can see for the males, there are some states in which, despite the FES 
data being pooled over all 6 years, there are still few individuals in the state. In 
the states “notM EMP 1”, “notM EMP 2” and “notM EMP 3+” this led to 
erratic and unreliable poverty rates. In each of these problem male states the 
corresponding female state has sufficient numbers to provide a reliable poverty 
rate. Therefore in these states, we derived a poverty rate by taking the ratio of 
the female poverty rate to the male poverty rate for the “notM EMP 0” state – 
for which both females and males have sufficient numbers to provide a reliable 
poverty rate – and multiplied the female state poverty rate for the problem states 
by this ratio and imputed this as the male poverty rate in these problem states.  
 
Table B3: Frequency Distributions for the Number of Observations with 
Income Non-Missing in the BHPS Estimation Sample 
MALE 
Number  Frequency Percent Cumulative
0  79 3.16 3.16 
1  135 5.40 8.56 
2  244 9.76 18.33 
3  207 8.28 26.61 
4  231 9.24 35.85 
5  336 13.45 49.30 
6  1267 50.70 100.00 
Total  2499 100.00  
 
FEMALE 
Number  Frequency Percent Cumulative
0  154 5.86 5.86 
1  181 6.88 12.74 
2  220 8.37 21.10 
3  206 7.83 28.94 
4  210 7.98 36.92 
5  359 13.65 50.57 
6  1300 49.43 100.00 
Total  2630 100.00  
 
 57
Table B4 (M): Number of Observations with Income Non-Missing in the BHPS Estimation Sample and in the FES, 
by year and state 
MALE 
 1991  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
state/year BHPS FES  BHPS FES BHPS FES BHPS FES BHPS FES BHPS FES 
              
notM notE 0 128 164  176 214 172 178 185 197 112 197 94 188 
notM notE 1 3 15  2 11 4 13 4 7 3 8 2 20 
notM notE 2 2 2  1 4 1 5 2 5 2 5 1 7 
notM notE 3+ 0 3  1 3 2 5 1 2 0 3 1 3 
notM EMP 0 393 419  436 401 372 374 358 391 352 358 355 332 
notM EMP 1 8 13  6 20 5 14 7 18 11 20 10 15 
notM EMP 2 1 6  1 8 1 9 0 12 1 4 0 10 
notM EMP 3+ 1 1  0 3 0 1 0 3 1 2 0 0 
Marr notE 0 39 191  52 248 45 265 51 209 48 231 51 184 
Marr notE 1 31 90  29 106 22 98 26 105 25 97 30 95 
Marr notE 2 39 99  41 126 36 110 29 98 30 80 26 90 
Marr notE 3+ 19 71  25 90 23 82 31 88 24 71 21 95 
Marr EMP 0 458 1173  565 1167 518 1035 475 1074 494 1049 527 1018 
Marr EMP 1 268 619  280 602 266 564 295 554 253 555 240 585 
Marr EMP 2 355 731  338 758 299 722 276 710 264 736 282 662 
Marr EMP 3+ 120 295  116 311 108 316 100 289 100 296 94 284 
              
Total 1865 3892  2069 4072 1874 3791 1840 3762 1720 3712 1734 3588 
 
 58
Table B4 (F): Number of Observations with Income Non-Missing in the BHPS Estimation Sample and in the FES, by 
year and state 
FEMALE 
 1991  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
state/year BHPS FES  BHPS FES BHPS FES BHPS FES BHPS FES BHPS FES 
              
notM notE 0 75 143  136 168 126 156 122 177 106 144 84 115 
notM notE 1 40 103  56 112 54 122 59 103 53 112 44 120 
notM notE 2 27 64  22 94 18 100 20 97 22 109 17 87 
notM notE 3+ 19 47  23 61 16 72 18 65 10 68 14 58 
notM EMP 0 305 325  337 355 288 342 294 345 259 354 266 314 
notM EMP 1 53 75  52 107 49 97 46 90 46 95 54 100 
notM EMP 2 29 55  31 61 23 61 27 73 23 67 27 75 
notM EMP 3+ 8 15  8 23 7 28 3 14 2 21 2 21 
Marr notE 0 71 514  94 544 87 529 79 334 85 333 108 293 
Marr notE 1 87 272  81 301 78 243 86 238 82 215 77 181 
Marr notE 2 126 323  130 324 104 316 92 270 73 260 90 258 
Marr notE 3+ 59 189  56 216 54 212 52 187 57 164 49 195 
Marr EMP 0 511 850  585 871 532 771 514 949 510 947 513 909 
Marr EMP 1 210 437  205 407 195 419 216 421 190 437 209 499 
Marr EMP 2 245 507  223 560 198 516 176 538 179 556 173 494 
Marr EMP 3+ 75 177  69 185 63 186 59 190 47 203 45 184 
              
Total 1940 4096  2108 4389 1892 4170 1863 4091 1744 4085 1772 3903 
 
Note: the state labels identify: the de facto marital status in the state: not married (notM) or married (Marr); the employment status of the state: not employed 
(notE) or employed (EMP); and the number of children that the individual in this state has: 0,1,2 or 3+. 
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Appendix C: Reconciling FES and BHPS 
For our approach to modelling poverty to succeed, the FES poverty rates and 
the BHPS poverty rates should be close to one another. We compare the overall 
male and female poverty rates in each dataset in each year from 1991-1996, and 
compare the poverty lines in each year (see Table C1 below). In doing so we 
discover a problem in that, despite the poverty lines being close in terms of 
equivalised (McClements) £s, the BHPS poverty rates are systematically lower 
than the corresponding rates from the FES. This presents a problem as we will 
not be able to fit poverty at all in the simulations if the poverty rates that we use 
in them are systematically higher than in the “real” BHPS data – we will always 
be over predicting poverty.  
 
Looking at the distribution of income in each dataset reveals that, in each year, 
the driving force behind the disparity is the difference in the distribution of 
income amongst workers and non-workers in the two datasets. Graphs C(i) and 
C(ii) below, show respectively, the distribution of income in 1996 for male 
BHPS members of our estimation sample and the corresponding distribution for 
males in the FES. In each case the poverty line is marked. We can see that there 
is a large spike just below the poverty line in the FES income distribution – 
hence the differing poverty rates. 
 
Graphs C(iii) – C (vi) below, reveal that this is the case because the income of 
non-workers in the BHPS is more spread than is the case in the FES. The non-
worker incomes in the FES are much more positively skewed to the right with a 
large spike just below the poverty line, pushing the poverty rate up markedly 
higher than the BHPS poverty rate. The BHPS non-worker incomes are 
positively skewed but much less so than the FES, the non-workers exhibiting 
more of a spread of incomes and with much less of a spike just below the 
poverty line. The graphs show similar features in each year from 1991-1995 and 
can be obtained on request from the authors. The female graphs exhibit the 
same patterns and can similarly be obtained from the authors. 
 
However, though we know the reason why the rates are different, we cannot 
simply lower the FES state poverty rates in certain states as it would be arbitrary 
as to what they should be lowered to – it is because in many states in each year 
of the BHPS we do not have sufficient numbers to give reliable estimates of the 
state poverty rates that we use the FES.  
 
The solution to this problem is to calculate the FES poverty rate across both 
men and women in each year, and use this as the benchmark, evaluated as it is 
over many more individuals than are in the BHPS in each year. The mean 
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number of observations on men and women in each year of the FES is 7925 – 
more than double the BHPS mean of 3854, and in each year it is the case that 
the FES has approximately double the number of observations in the BHPS (for 
details see Table C2 below). We then take our sample of BHPS individuals and 
raise the monetary value of the poverty line in each year such that the overall 
poverty rate across men and women is the same in each year of the BHPS as the 
overall poverty rate across men and women in each year of the FES. We look at 
the poverty rates across the men and women together so that we generate a 
household poverty status – if we had looked to raise the poverty lines such that 
the annual male poverty rates in the BHPS were equal to the corresponding FES 
rates and done likewise for the females, we would be in danger of creating cases 
where, for example, the male in a household is in poverty but the female in the 
household – who has the same household income – is not in poverty due to the 
differing income distributions of males and females. As poverty is a feature of 
households rather than individuals, we align the poverty rates across men and 
women together in each year, in each of the datasets.  
 
Since we know that the non-workers’ incomes are more spread out in the BHPS 
sample and that they overlap more with workers’ incomes, we know that as we 
raise the poverty line, we will arrive at the FES aggregate poverty rate before 
we reach the level of poverty in the real BHPS non-worker states that we find in 
the FES non-worker states – therefore the poverty rates in the real BHPS non-
worker states will be below the corresponding FES figures. Moreover, as we 
have raised the poverty line we have placed more of the lower income workers 
– those with similar net household incomes as the non-workers – in poverty, 
thus increasing the poverty rate in some working states in the real BHPS data 
above what it is in the FES. Thus the poverty rates in certain states will be 
higher in the real BHPS data than is the case in the FES (which we use to 
provide the poverty rates in the simulations), and lower in other states; however 
by raising the poverty line we have made poverty in the BHPS more like the 
poverty in the FES.  
 
The rates in the FES states used for the simulations and the “real” BHPS are 
clearly not going to be identical. That would give a perfect test of the 
simulations since if the model fitted the demographic and employment states 
occupation correctly we would then have the poverty rate exactly right. Rather 
the poverty rates that we use from the FES are similar, they are not perfectly 
right in every state – some are too high, some are too low – but they are close 
enough that if we simulate the demographic and employment transitions 
accurately we will have an overall poverty rate which is close to the real BHPS 
poverty rate since we know that in the BHPS the overall rate is the same as it is 
in the FES. 
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For this strategy to be effective the relationship between the male and female 
components of overall poverty in the BHPS have to be the same as they are in 
the FES. The reason why we have to make this assumption is because it is the 
overall (across men and women) poverty rates that are lined up to be the same in 
each year, in both datasets. The aggregate male poverty rate and the aggregate 
female poverty rate in each year will only be the same in each dataset if the 
male contribution to aggregate poverty and female contribution to aggregate 
poverty is the same in each dataset. We can check this by calculating the male 
and female poverty rates separately in each dataset in each year from 1991-
1996. Table C3 shows the annual poverty rates for each gender in our BHPS 
sample with the poverty line raised such that the poverty rate across men and 
women is the same as it is in the FES. Alongside these in the table are the 
annual poverty rates for each gender in the FES. We can see that in each year 
though the male poverty rates are not identical, they are very close, slightly 
higher in the BHPS than is the case in the FES. Given that we know the poverty 
rate across men and women in the BHPS is equated to the corresponding rate in 
the FES, the male BHPS rates being slightly higher than the male FES rates 
dictates that the BHPS female rates must be lower than the corresponding FES 
rates. Again though, they are very close in each year. 
 
As the male and female poverty rates in each year in the BHPS are very close to 
the corresponding rates in the FES, we know that for each gender the state 
poverty rates in the simulations will aggregate out to be close to the real BHPS 
figure, if the demographic and employment transitions are accurately modelled. 
Differences in the poverty experience between the “real” data and the 
simulations will primarily reflect differences in demographic and employment 
state occupation and the fact that there is no persistence in income in the 
simulations.  
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Table C1: BHPS (in sample) and 
FES annual poverty rates and 
poverty lines 
 
MALE POVERTY RATES 
Year BHPS FES 
91 7.74 11.54 
92 7.98 13.26 
93 8.46 13.35 
94 7.39 12.79 
95 6.79 12.23 
96 6.45 13.32 
 
ANNUAL POVERTY LINES IN 
MCCLEMENTS EQUIVALISED £S 
Year BHPS FES 
91 112.22 134.15 
92 116.05 124.42 
93 119.94 126.92 
94 122.40 132.73 
95 130.30 137.77 
96 136.66 139.96 
 
Table C2: Number of 
Observations with Income Non-
Missing across male and females 
combined in the BHPS Estimation 
Sample and in the FES, by year 
 
Year BHPS FES 
1991 3914 7988 
1992 4311 8461 
1993 3876 7961 
1994 3814 7853 
1995 3583 7797 
1996 3626 7491 
Total 23124 47551 
 
 
FEMALE POVERTY RATES 
Year BHPS FES 
91 9.88 14.79 
92 9.39 16.68 
93 9.20 17.67 
94 8.15 17.26 
95 9.35 16.35 
96 8.57 17.81 
 
Poverty rates are calculated for all 
individuals in households in which 
the head of household is 60 years 
old or younger. The poverty line in 
each case is set at 50% of the 
median (before housing costs) net 
household equivalised 
(McClements) income. The median 
is assessed whilst all individuals 
within each household are in the 
data with their household income 
recorded, hence it is an individual 
level measure of poverty. In the 
FES, in all couple households the 
man is taken to be the head of the 
house. Therefore in order to 
construct female poverty rates it is 
necessary to include married males 
as females.  
 
Table C3: BHPS and FES annual 
poverty rates, by gender 
 
 Male Poverty  Female Poverty 
Year BHPS FES  BHPS FES 
1991 11.8 11.3  14.6 15.1 
1992 13.9 13.1  16.6 17.1 
1993 14.8 13.3  16.9 18.0 
1994 14.2 12.7  16.5 17.5 
1995 13.3 12.3  16.6 16.9 
1996 13.6 13.6  18.2 18.4 
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